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Abstract
We discuss an open-loop backward Stackelberg differential game involving single leader and single
follower. Unlike most Stackelberg game literature, the state to be controlled is characterized by a
backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) for which the terminal- instead initial-condition is
specified as a priori; the decisions of leader consist of a static terminal-perturbation and a dynamic
linear-quadratic control. In addition, the terminal control is subject to (convex-closed) pointwise and
(affine) expectation constraints. Both constraints are arising from real applications such as mathe-
matical finance. For information pattern: the leader announces both terminal and open-loop dynamic
decisions at the initial time while takes account the best response of follower. Then, two interrelated
optimization problems are sequentially solved by the follower (a backward linear-quadratic (BLQ)
problem) and the leader (a mixed terminal-perturbation and backward-forward LQ (BFLQ) problem).
Our open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is represented by some coupled backward-forward stochastic
differential equations (BFSDEs) with mixed initial-terminal conditions. Our BFSDEs also involve
nonlinear projection operator (due to pointwise constraint) combining with a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) system (due to expectation constraint) via Lagrange multiplier. The global solvability of such
BFSDEs is also discussed in some nontrivial cases. Our results are applied to one financial example.
Key words: Backward stochastic differential equation, Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) system, point-
wise and affine constraints, Stackelberg game, backward linear-quadratic control, terminal perturbation.
1 Introduction
Let (Ω,F ,F,P) be a complete filtered probability space on which a standard one-dimensional Brownian
motion W = {W (t), 0 ≤ t <∞} is defined, where F = {Ft}t≥0 is the natural filtration of W augmented
by all the P-null sets in F . Consider the following controlled linear backward stochastic differential
equation (BSDE) on a finite time horizon [0, T ]:
dX(s) =
[
A(s)X(s) +B1(s)u1(s) +B2(s)u2(s) + C(s)Z(s)
]
ds+ Z(s)dW (s), X(T ) = ξ, (1)
where A(·), B1(·), B2(·), C(·) are F-progressively measurable processes defined on Ω× [0, T ] with proper
dimensions. Unlike forward stochastic differential equation (SDE), solution of BSDE (1) consists of a
pair of adapted processes (X(·), Z(·)) ∈ Rn×Rn where the second component Z(·) is necessary to ensure
the adaptiveness of X(·) when propagating from terminal- backward to initial-time. In (1), u1(·) and
u2(·) are dynamic decision processes employed by Player 1 (the leader, denoted by AL) and Player 2 (the
follower, denoted by AF ) in the game with values in R
m1 and Rm2 respectively. Moreover, unlike SDE,
the terminal condition ξ is specified in BSDE (1) by the leader AL at the initial time, and committed
to be steered together with the follower by dynamic u2(·). For some illustrating example, ξ acts as
some terminal hedging payoff on T , while u1(·), u2(·) represent the possible dynamic portfolio selection or
1The work of Ying Hu is partially supported by Lebesgue Center of Mathematics “Investissementsd’avenir”program-ANR-11-
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consumption process on [0, T ]. The terminal ξ to be steered may capture some appropriate approximation
for quadratic deviation K|XT − ξ|2 with penalty index K −→ +∞ (see [31]).
Furthermore, let K be a nonempty closed convex subset in Rn. Then, for a deterministic scalar β and
vector α ∈ Rn, we can define the following two constraints on admissible terminal payoff ξ: Pointwise constraint: UK = L
2
FT (Ω;K);
Affine expectation constraint: Uα,β =
{
ξ
∣∣∣ξ ∈ L2FT (Ω;Rn), 〈α,Eξ〉 ≥ β}. (2)
Constraints of such kinds arise naturally in financial applications (e.g., see [4] for expectation constraint,
[14, 17, 28] for pointwise one). In particular, the mean-variance portfolio selection with no-shorting yield
such constraints both. Now, we define U(K, α, β) , UK
⋂
Uα,β for the admissible terminal control set.
Detailed discussion on feasibility of U(K, α, β) is deferred in Subsection 4.2. In addition, the following
Hilbert spaces are introduced for dynamic admissible controls:
Ui[0, T ] ,
{
ui : [0, T ]× Ω→ R
mi
∣∣∣ui(·) is F-progressively measurable, E∫ T
0
|ui(s)|
2ds <∞
}
, i = 1, 2.
Any element (ξ, u1(·)) ∈ U(K, α, β)×U1[0, T ] is called an admissible control ofAL, and any element u2(·) ∈
U2[0, T ] is called an admissible (dynamic) control of AF . Under some mild conditions on coefficients, for
any (ξ, u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ U(K, α, β)×U1[0, T ]×U2[0, T ], state equation (1) admits a unique square-integrable
adapted solution (X(·), Z(·)) ≡ (X(·; ξ, u1(·), u2(·)), Z(·; ξ, u1(·), u2(·))). To evaluate the performance of
decisions ξ, u1(·) and u2(·), we introduce the following cost functionals:
J1(ξ, u1(·), u2(·)) ,
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
〈Q1(s)X(s), X(s)〉+ 〈S1(s)Z(s), Z(s)〉+
〈
R111(s)u1(s), u1(s)
〉 ]
ds
+ 〈G1ξ, ξ〉+ 〈H1X(0), X(0)〉
}
,
J2(ξ, u1(·), u2(·)) ,
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
〈Q2(s)X(s), X(s)〉+ 〈S2(s)Z(s), Z(s)〉+
〈
R222(s)u2(s), u2(s)
〉 ]
ds
+ 〈H2X(0), X(0)〉
}
,
(3)
where Q1(·), Q2(·), S1(·), S2(·), R111(·), and R
2
22(·) are all F-progressively measurable symmetric matrix
valued processes, defined on Ω × [0, T ], of proper dimensions, G1 is FT -measurable symmetric matrix
valued random variable of proper dimension and H1, H2 are deterministic symmetric matrices of proper
dimensions. For i = 1, 2, Ji(ξ, u1(·), u2(·)) is the cost functional for agent i.
Let us now explain the Stackelberg differential game in some mixed backward linear quadratic (BLQ)
and terminal-perturbation pattern.
At initial time, leader AL announces some terminal (random) target ξ ∈ U(K, α, β) (to be reachable
at terminal time T ) and his planned dynamic strategy u1(·) ∈ U1[0, T ] over entire horizon [0, T ]. ξ is
treated in a hard-constraint case, or in a limiting soft-constraint case (see [2]) when the soft-penalty on
quadratic deviation K|XT − ξ|2 is endowed with sufficiently large attenuation level K > 0. In both cases,
the state dynamics becomes (1) (see [31]). Actually, ξ may be interpreted as specific requirement of
contractual or regulatory nature to reflect some risky position concern at terminal time T . Then, given
the knowledge of leader’s strategy, the follower AF determines his best response strategy u¯2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ]
over entire horizon to minimize J2(ξ, u1(·), u2(·)). Noticing state X is steered imperatively towards the
predetermined random target ξ at maturity T . Since the follower’s optimal response depends on the
leader’s strategy, the leader can take it into account as a priori before announcing his committed strategy
to minimize J1(ξ, u1(·), u¯2(·)) over (ξ, u1(·)) ∈ U(K, α, β) × U1[0, T ].
A principal-agent framework. The above procedure might fit into some principal-agent prob-
lem (see [8]) but in a backward framework: AL is the principal (owner of given firm) who specifies,
at initial contract concluding time, some terminal achievement target ξ to be realized by the agent in
contractual manner together with his decision process u1(·). Noticing u1 maybe interpreted as his com-
mitted consumption/capital withdraw process, an outflow on state dynamics X as firm’s wealth process.
Meanwhile, AF acts as the agent (manager) who is stimulated to reach such target by utilizing his in-
vestment/management/wage process u2(·). When setting contract, AL may set some constraints on ξ
with business concerns, while AF is pushed to realize the terminal level ξ once contract is executed due
to some guarantee or breach clause. Thus, a BSDE state with ξ follows through the contractual force.
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Rigorously speaking, AF aims to find a map α¯ : U(K, α, β)×U1[0, T ]→ U2[0, T ] and AL aims to find
a control (ξ, u1(·)) ∈ U(K, α, β) × U1[0, T ] such that
J2(ξ, u1(·), α¯[ξ, u1(·)](·)) = min
u2(·)∈U2[0,T ]
J2(ξ, u1(·), u2(·)), ∀(ξ, u1(·)) ∈ U(K, α, β) × U1[0, T ],
J1(ξ¯, u¯1(·), α¯[ξ¯, u¯1](·)) = min
ξ∈U(K,α,β),u1∈U1[0,T ]
J1(ξ, u1(·), α¯[ξ, u1(·)](·)).
If the above pair (ξ¯, u¯1(·), α¯(ξ¯, u¯1(·))) exists, we refer to it as an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium.
The setup in (1)-(3) above is especially motivated by optimal trading and quadratic hedging prob-
lem in financial mathematics when combining with terminal payoff subject to pointwise and integral
constraints (see example in Section 6). Accordingly, the main novelties of our contribution are triple:
(i) introduction of a new class of backward Stackelberg differential games with (pointwise and expec-
tation affine) constraints and a mixed combination of terminal-perturbation and linear quadratic (LQ)
control (both in backward sense); (ii) the characterization of open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium via new
class of backward-forward stochastic differential equations (BFSDEs) with Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
qualification condition; (iii) global solvability for above BFSDEs and some related Riccati equations.
To highlight above novelties, it is helpful to have some literature review comparing to some relevant
existing works, especially to BLQ control, (forward) Stackelberg differential games, and various control
problems with constraints imposed.
LQ control and game of backward state dynamics. Nonlinear BSDE was initially introduced
in [35] and is a well-formulated stochastic system hence it has been found various applications, for
example, on stochastic recursive utility in economics by [9]. Interested readers may refer [11] for more
BSDE applications in financial mathematics. Moreover, the relationship between BSDE and forward LQ
optimal control is studied in [25]. Based on it, [31] discussed a BLQ optimal control problem motivated
by quadratic hedging. [26] studied the BLQ optimal control problem with mean-field type. [19] studied
BLQ optimal control with partial information and give some applications in pension fund optimization
problems. Furthermore, some recent literature on games of BSDE can be found in [43, 20].
Stackelberg game. The Stackelberg game (also termed as leader-follower game) was first introduced
by [39]. It differs from Nash game in its decision hierarchy of involved agents. Stackelberg games have
been extensively explored from various settings. We list few works more relevant to ours: for deterministic
Stackelberg game, see [2, 32], etc. For stochastic cases, [1] studied LQ Stackelberg differential game, but
the state and control variables do not enter the diffusion coefficient. [44] studied a more general Stackel-
berg game with random coefficients, control enters diffusion terms and control weight may be indefinite.
[3] investigated Stackelberg differential game in various different information structures, whereas the dif-
fusion coefficient does not contain the control variables. [34] studied stochastic Stackelberg differential
game with time-delayed information. Notice that all above Stackelberg game works are framed in forward
sense with underlying state as a forward SDE that differs substantially from our backward one here.
Constrained control and game. Naturally, control or game problems are always subject to possible
constraints during its decision making. Such constraints may be posed on underlying state indirectly or
decision input directly, or both in some mixed sense. From another viewpoint, these constraints may
be structured as soft- or hard-constraint. In soft-constraint, a penalization depending on the deviation
from constraints should be implemented in cost functional with some attenuation parameter indicating
the softness. Hard-constraint might be viewed as limiting case of soft-constraint with attenuation index
tends to infinity. Thus, hard-constraint should be strictly followed in decision process to avoid any cost
blow-up. There exist considerable works on constrained stochastic control or games and we name a few
more relevant. For example, [17] studied stochastic LQ control constrained in general convex-closed cone,
and some extended Riccati method is proposed; [6] extends [17] to infinite time horizon case. [17, 6]
are both structured as hard constraint and include no-shorting of mean-variance problem as their special
case. Moreover, [27] studied LQ control problems with general input constraint and its applications in
financial portfolio selection with no-shorting constraints. Some linear constraints are also treated therein.
[30, 29] studied various classes of integral affine and quadratic constraints.
Terminal-perturbation with constraints. There arise various scenarios from mathematical fi-
nance with constraints on terminal payoffs that are static, e.g., the Markowitz mean-variance model
poses some expectation constraint on terminal return. Thereby, it can convert to a family of indefinite
stochastic LQ optimal controls with terminal constraints ([46, 27]). [4] first employed backward approach
to solve mean-variance problem by Lagrange method and obtained the optimal replicating portfolio strat-
egy by solving some BSDE. To deal with state constraints of dynamic optimization problem, [12] (see
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also [37]) introduced the backward perturbation method and terminal variable of BSDE is regarded as
some “control variable”. The terminal-perturbation method is well studied in financial mathematics and
stochastic control (see e.g. [21, 22, 23]).
Compared with the above literature reviewed, main contributions of the present paper maybe sum-
marized along the following lines:
• We introduce a new class of backward stochastic Stackelberg differential games featured by a
mixed terminal-perturbation and BLQ control pattern. Other technical features include: backward-
forward state system, random coefficients and Riccati equations, indefinite control weights.
• Terminal-perturbation is subject to two (pointwise and affine expectation) constraints, some duality
approach is invoked to tackle such constraints.
• The open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is represented by a coupled BFSDEs with mixed initial-
terminal conditions; projection operator and constraint qualification conditions. To our knowledge,
it is the first time to derive such constrained forward-backward systems. Related global wellposedness
is also studied in some special but nontrivial cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some preliminaries and formulate
the Stackelberg game in backward sense. The BLQ problem for follower is studied in Section 3, the
mixed terminal-perturbation/backward-forward linear-quadratic (BFLQ) problem for leader is discussed
in Section 4. In particular, Stackelberg equilibrium strategy is represented by some coupled BFSDEs
with mixed initial-terminal conditions and constrained Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) system. The global
solvability of such BFSDEs is further discussed in Sections 5 in nontrivial cases. As the application, one
example is discussed in Section 6.
2 Preliminary and BLQ Stackelberg game formulation
The following notations will be used throughout the paper. Let Rn denote the n-dimensional Euclidean
space with standard Euclidean norm | · | and standard Euclidean inner product 〈·, ·〉. The transpose of a
vector (or matrix) x is denoted by x⊤. Tr(A) denotes the trace of a square matrix A. Let Rn×m be the
Hilbert space consisting of all (n×m)-matrices with the inner product 〈A,B〉 , Tr(AB⊤) and the norm
||A|| , 〈A,A〉
1
2 . Denote the set of symmetric n×n matrices with real elements by Sn and n× n identity
matrices by In. If M ∈ S
n is positive (semi-)definite, we write M > (≥) 0. If there exists a constant
δ > 0 such that M ≥ δI, we write M ≫ 0. Let Sn+ be the space of all positive semi-definite matrices of
Sn and Sˆn+ be the space of all positive definite matrices of S
n.
Consider a finite time horizon [0, T ] for a fixed T > 0. Let H be a given Hilbert space. The set of
H-valued continuous functions is denoted by C([0, T ];H). If N(·) ∈ C([0, T ]; Sn) and N(t) > (≥) 0 for
every t ∈ [0, T ], we say that N(·) is positive (semi-)definite, which is denoted by N(·) > (≥) 0. For any
t ∈ [0, T ) and Euclidean space H, let(for the deterministic process, the subscripts Ft or F will be omitted)
L2Ft(Ω;H) = {ξ : Ω→ H|ξ is Ft-measurable, E|ξ|
2 <∞},
L∞Ft(Ω;H) = {ξ : Ω→ H|ξ is Ft-measurable, esssupω∈Ω|ξ(ω)| <∞},
L2
F
(0, T ;H) = {φ : [0, T ]× Ω→ H
∣∣∣φ is F-progressively measurable, E∫ T
0
|φ(s)|2ds <∞},
L∞
F
(0, T ;H) = {φ : [0, T ]× Ω→ H|φ is F-progressively measurable, esssups∈[0,T ]esssupω∈Ω|φ(s)| <∞},
L2
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];H)) = {φ : [0, T ]× Ω→ H|φ is F-adapted, continuous, E[ sup
s∈[0,T ]
|φ(s)|2] <∞}.
Recall the sets Ui[0, T ] = L2F(0, T ;R
mi). For notational simplicity, let m = m1 +m2 and denote
B(·) = (B1(·), B2(·)), R1(·) =
(
R111(·) 0
0 0
)
, R2(·) =
(
0 0
0 R222(·)
)
.
Naturally, we identify u(·) = (u1(·)⊤, u2(·)⊤)⊤ ∈ U [0, T ] = U1[0, T ]× U2[0, T ]. With such notations, the
state equation (1) becomes
dX(s) =
[
A(s)X(s) +B(s)u(s) + C(s)Z(s)
]
ds+ Z(s)dW (s), X(T ) = ξ, (4)
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where the terminal condition ξ is a control variable with the constraints (2). The cost functionals become
J1(ξ, u(·)) =
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
〈Q1(s)X(s), X(s)〉+ 〈S1(s)Z(s), Z(s)〉+ 〈R1(s)u(s), u(s)〉
]
ds
+ 〈G1ξ, ξ〉+ 〈H1X(0), X(0)〉
}
,
J2(ξ, u(·)) =
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
〈Q2(s)X(s), X(s)〉+ 〈S2(s)Z(s), Z(s)〉+ 〈R2(s)u(s), u(s)〉
]
ds+ 〈H2X(0), X(0)〉
}
.
Let us introduce the following assumptions, which will be used later.
(H1) The coefficients of the state equation satisfy the following:
A(·) ∈ L∞
F
(0, T ;Rn×n), B(·) ∈ L∞
F
(0, T ;Rn×m), C(·) ∈ L∞
F
(0, T ;Rn×n).
(H2) The weighting coefficients of cost functional satisfy the following:
G1 ∈ L
∞
FT (Ω; S
n), H1, H2 ∈ S
n, Q1(·), Q2(·), S1(·), S2(·) ∈ L
∞
F
(0, T ; Sn), R1(·), R2(·) ∈ L
∞
F
(0, T ; Sm).
Under (H1), by [35, Theorem 3.1], for any ξ ∈ U(K, α, β) and u(·) ∈ U [0, T ], (4) admits a unique strong
solution (X(·), Z(·)) ∈ L2
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];Rn))× L2
F
(0, T ;Rn). Moreover, the following estimation holds:
E
[
sup
s∈[0,T ]
|X(s)|2 +
∫ T
0
|Z(s)|2ds
]
≤ LE
[
|ξ|2 +
∫ T
0
|u(s)|2ds
]
, (5)
where L > 0 is a constant which depends on the coefficients of (4). Therefore, under (H1)-(H2), the
functionals Ji(ξ, u(·)) = Ji(ξ, u1(·), u2(·)) are well-defined for all ξ ∈ U(K, α, β) and ui(·) ∈ Ui[0, T ],
i = 1, 2. If the coefficients in (4) are deterministic, by [41, Proposition 2.1], (4) admits a unique strong
solution under the following relaxed assumption:
(H1′) The coefficients of the state equation satisfy the following:
A(·) ∈ L1(0, T ;Rn×n), B(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn×m), C(·) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn×n).
Moreover, (5) still holds. Hereafter, time variable s will often be suppressed to simplify notations. We
briefly state the procedure of finding an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium: first, for any given (ξ, u1(·)),
AF should solve a BLQ control problem with α¯(ξ, u1(·)) as the best response functional; second, given
best response, AL then solves a BFLQ control and terminal-perturbation with optimal ξ¯ and u¯1(·). The
Stackelberg equilibrium follows by (ξ¯, u¯1(·), α¯(ξ¯, u¯1(·))).
3 Backward LQ problem for AF
For given (ξ, u1(·)) ∈ U(K, α, β) × U1[0, T ], the follower AF should solve the following BLQ Problem:
(BLQ): Minimize J2(ξ, u1(·), u2(·)) subject to (4), u2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ].
Definition 3.1 (a) For given (ξ, u1(·)) ∈ U(K, α, β)×U1[0, T ], problem (BLQ) is said to be finite if cost
functional J2(ξ, u1(·), u2(·)) is bounded from below, that is, infu2(·)∈U2[0,T ] J2(ξ, u1(·), u2(·)) > −∞;
(b) Problem (BLQ) is said to be (uniquely) solvable if there exists a (unique) u∗2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ] such that
J2(ξ, u1(·), u∗2(·)) = infu2(·)∈U2[0,T ] J2(ξ, u1(·), u2(·)). In this case, u
∗
2(·) is called minimizer of (BLQ).
We now give a representation of cost functional for (BLQ) which helps us to study its solvability. Its
proof is straightforward based on duality theory thus we omit details here.
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Proposition 3.1 Let (H1)-(H2) hold. There exist two bounded self-adjoint linear operators M2 :
U2[0, T ] → U2[0, T ], M1 : L2FT (Ω;R
n) × U1[0, T ] → U2[0, T ] and some M0 ∈ R depending on (ξ, u1(·))
such that
J2(ξ, u1(·), u2(·)) =
1
2
[
E〈M2(u2)(·), u2(·)〉 + 2E〈M1(ξ, u1)(·), u2(·)〉 +M0
]
,
with
M2(u2)(·) = R
2
22(·)u2(·)−B
⊤
2 (·)Y1(·), M1(ξ, u1)(·) = −B
⊤
2 (·)Y2(·)−B
⊤
2 (·)Y3(·),
M0 = −E
∫ T
0
〈B⊤1 (s)Y3(s), u1(s)〉ds+ E〈Y2(T ), ξ〉+ 2E〈Y3(T ), ξ〉,
(6)
where Y1, Y2, Y3 satisfy the following backward-forward systems:
dY1(s) =
[
−A⊤(s)Y1(s) +Q2(s)X1(s)
]
ds+
[
− C⊤(s)Y1(s) + S2(s)Z1(s)
]
dW (s),
dX1(s) =
[
A(s)X1(s) +B2(s)u2(s) + C(s)Z1(s)
]
ds+ Z1(s)dW (s),
X1(T ) = 0, Y1(0) = H2X1(0),
(7)

dY2(s) =
[
−A⊤(s)Y2(s) +Q2(s)X2(s)
]
ds+
[
− C⊤(s)Y2(s) + S2(s)Z2(s)
]
dW (s),
dX2(s) =
[
A(s)X2(s) + C(s)Z2(s)
]
ds+ Z2(s)dW (s),
X2(T ) = ξ, Y2(0) = H2X2(0),
dY3(s) =
[
−A⊤(s)Y3(s) +Q2(s)X3(s)
]
ds+
[
− C⊤(s)Y3(s) + S2(s)Z3(s)
]
dW (s),
dX3(s) =
[
A(s)X3(s) +B1(s)u1(s) + C(s)Z3(s)
]
ds+ Z3(s)dW (s),
X3(T ) = 0, Y3(0) = H2X3(0).
In the above, we use 〈·, ·〉 to denote inner products in different Hilbert spaces, which can be identified
from the context. Based on Proposition 3.1, we have the following result for the solvability of problem
(BLQ), whose proof is similar to that of [45, Theorem 6.2.2].
Proposition 3.2 Let (H1)-(H2) hold.
(a) Problem (BLQ) is finite only if (BLQ) is convex (i.e., M2 ≥ 0);
(b) Problem (BLQ) is (uniquely) solvable if and only if (iff ) (BLQ) is convex (M2 ≥ 0) and the
following stationary condition holds true: there exists a (unique) u¯2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ] such that
M2(u¯2)(·) +M1(ξ, u1)(·) = 0. (8)
Moreover, (8) implies that R(M1(ξ, u1)) ⊂ R(M2(u¯2)), where R(S) stands for the range of operator
(matrix ) S.
(c) If (BLQ) is uniformly convex (i.e., M2 ≫ 0), then problem (BLQ) admits a unique optimal control
given by
u¯2(·) = −M
−1
2 (M1(ξ, u1))(·).
(a)-(c) in Proposition 3.2 can be summarized by the following inclusion relation diagram:
uniform convexity =⇒ unique solvability =⇒ solvability(⇐⇒ convexity, stationary condition)
=⇒ finiteness =⇒ convexity.
Given representation (6), Fre´chet derivative of (8) takes the following form:
R222(·)u¯2(·)− B
⊤
2 (·)Y1(·)−B
⊤
2 (·)Y2(·)−B
⊤
2 (·)Y3(·) = 0.
Therefore, if we define Y¯ = Y1 + Y2 + Y3, X¯ = X1 +X2 +X3, Z¯ = Z1 + Z2 + Z3, we have the following
solvability result in terms of BFSDEs.
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Theorem 3.1 Under (H1)-(H2), for any u2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ], suppose that
E〈M2(u2)(·), u2(·)〉 = E
∫ T
0
〈R222(s)u2(s)−B
⊤
2 (s)Y1(s), u2(s)〉ds ≥ 0, (9)
where (Y1, X1, Z1) is the solution of (7) with respect to u2(·). Then problem (BLQ) is (uniquely) solvable
with an (the) optimal pair (X¯(·), Z¯(·), u¯2(·)) iff there (uniquely) exists a 4-tuple (Y¯ (·), X¯(·), Z¯(·), u¯2(·))
satisfying BFSDEs
dY¯ (s) =
[
−A⊤(s)Y¯ (s) +Q2(s)X¯(s)
]
ds+
[
− C⊤(s)Y¯ (s) + S2(s)Z¯(s)
]
dW (s),
dX¯(s) =
[
A(s)X¯(s) +B1(s)u1(s) +B2(s)u¯2(s) + C(s)Z¯(s)
]
ds+ Z¯(s)dW (s),
Y¯ (0) = H2X¯(0), X¯(T ) = ξ,
(10)
such that
R222(s)u¯2(s)−B
⊤
2 (s)Y¯ (s) = 0, s ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s. (11)
Let us give the following inverse assumption.
(H3) R222(·) is invertible and (R
2
22(·))
−1 ∈ L∞
F
(0, T ;Rm2).
Clearly, under (H3), optimal control u¯2(·) can be further represented as
u¯2(s) = (R
2
22(s))
−1B2(s)
⊤Y¯ (s), (12)
and (10)-(11) are equivalent to the following BFSDEs:
dY¯ (s) =
[
−A⊤(s)Y¯ (s) +Q2(s)X¯(s)
]
ds+
[
− C⊤(s)Y¯ (s) + S2(s)Z¯(s)
]
dW (s),
dX¯(s) =
[
A(s)X¯(s) +B1(s)u1(s) +B2(s)(R
2
22(s))
−1B⊤2 (s)Y¯ (s) + C(s)Z¯(s)
]
ds+ Z¯(s)dW (s),
Y¯ (0) = H2X¯(0), X¯(T ) = ξ.
(13)
BFSDEs (13) differs from classical forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) because
forward state Y¯ (·) depends on backward state X¯(·) via initial X¯(0) instead terminal X¯(T ). Unlike Yong
[44], the state (13) is not decoupled thus its global solvability is not straightforward. Regarding this, we
have the following statement:
Corollary 3.1 Under (H1)-(H3), let (9) hold. Then Problem (BLQ) is (pathwise uniquely) solvable iff
BFSDEs (13) admits a (unique) strong solution (Y¯ (·), X¯(·), Z¯(·)) ∈ L2
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];Rn))×L2
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];Rn))×
L2
F
(0, T ;Rn).
If uniformly convexity holds, i.e., there exists a constant γ > 0 such that for any u2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ],
E〈M2(u2)(·), u2(·)〉 = E
∫ T
0
〈R222(s)u2(s)−B
⊤
2 (s)Y1(s), u2(s)〉ds ≥ γE
∫ T
0
|u2(s)|
2ds, (14)
then (BLQ) is uniquely solvable. Therefore, it follows from Corollary 3.1 that BFSDEs (13) admits a
unique strong solution (Y¯ (·), X¯(·), Z¯(·)). Next, we will study the uniformly convex condition (14) of
(BLQ). First, introduce the following auxiliary BLQ problem (ABLQ):
Minimize J (u2(·)) = E
{∫ T
0
[
〈Q2x(s), x(s)〉 + 〈S2z(s), z(s)〉+ 〈R
2
22u2(s), u2(s)〉
]
ds+ 〈H2x(0), x(0)〉
}
,
subject to dx(s) =
[
A(s)x(s) +B2(s)u2(s) + C(s)z(s)
]
ds+ z(s)dW (s), x(T ) = 0, s ∈ [0, T ].
Noting that for (ABLQ), its functional J (u2(·)) = E〈M2(u2)(·), u2(·)〉, the left hand side of (9). There-
fore, convexity condition (9) holds iff (ABLQ) is well-posed with a necessarily nonnegative minimal cost.
Moreover, if there exists a constant γ > 0 such that J (u2(·)) > γE
∫ T
0
|u2(s)|2ds for any u2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ],
the uniformly convexity condition (14) holds. Now we introduce the following standard assumptions
(SA-1): H2 ≥ 0, Q2(·) ≥ 0, S2(·) ≥ 0, R
2
22(·)≫ 0.
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For any given nonsingular symmetric matrixM , we introduce the following Riccati equation (denoted by
(SRE-1)):
dP = −
[
Q2 + PA+A
⊤P − PB2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 P − (PC +K)(P + S2)
−1(C⊤P +K)
]
ds+KdW (s),
P (T ) =M,
P (s) + S2(s) > 0, 0 ≤ s ≤ T.
Proposition 3.3 Under (H1)-(H3), if R222(·) > 0 and Riccati equation (SRE-1) has a solution (P (·),K(·)) ∈
L∞
F
(0, T ; Sn)× L2
F
(0, T ; Sn) such that P (0) +H2 ≥ 0. Then for any u2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ],
J (u2(·)) ≥ 0,
and in this case, (BLQ) is convex on u2(·). Moreover, if there exists a constant δ > 0 and R222(·) ≥ δI,
then there exists a constant γ > 0 such that
J (u2(·)) ≥ δγE
∫ T
0
|u2(s)|
2ds,
and in this case, (BLQ) is uniformly convex on u2(·). In particular, under (SA-1), (BLQ) is uniformly
convex on u2(·).
The proof of Proposition 3.3 is given in the Appendix, Section 7.1.
4 Terminal-perturbation and BFLQ problem of AL
Considering (12), the corresponding state process for AL becomes the following BFSDEs:
dY (s) =
[
−A⊤(s)Y (s) +Q2(s)X(s)
]
ds+
[
− C⊤(s)Y (s) + S2(s)Z(s)
]
dW (s),
dX(s) =
[
A(s)X(s) +B1(s)u1(s) +B2(s)(R
2
22(s))
−1B⊤2 (s)Y (s) + C(s)Z(s)
]
ds+ Z(s)dW (s),
Y (0) = H2X(0), X(T ) = ξ,
(15)
which is controlled by ξ (terminal-perturbation) and u1(·) with the following cost functional
J1(ξ, u1(·)) =
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
〈Q1(s)X(s), X(s)〉+ 〈S1(s)Z(s), Z(s)〉+
〈
R111(s)u1(s), u1(s)
〉 ]
ds
+ 〈G1ξ, ξ〉+ 〈H1X(0), X(0)〉
}
.
The existence and uniqueness of BFSDEs (15) is established in Corollary 3.1. Now, AL should solve the
following mixed terminal-perturbation and BFLQ problem for above system:
(P) : Minimize J1(ξ, u1(·)) subject to (15), (ξ, u1(·)) ∈ U(K, α, β) × U1[0, T ].
We denote above problem as (P) for primal problem, to be compared with the dual problem that will be
introduced later. Now, it is necessary to set some definitions pertinent to its solvability.
Definition 4.1 (a) Problem (P) is said to be finite if cost functional J1 is bounded from below, that is,
µp , inf(ξ,u1(·))∈U(K,α,β)×U1[0,T ] J1(ξ, u1(·)) > −∞. µp is called the value of (primal) problem (P);
(b) Problem (P) is said to be (uniquely) solvable if there exists a (unique) (ξ∗, u∗1(·)) ∈ U(K, α, β) ×
U1[0, T ] such that µp = J1(ξ∗, u∗1(·)). In this case, (ξ
∗, u∗1(·)) is called minimizer of problem (P).
For solvability, a related definition is the convexity. Considering U(K, α, β) is closed-convex, we formulate
the following trivial definition.
Definition 4.2 Problem (P) is said to be convex if its cost functional J1 is convex on (ξ, u1(·)). Its
strictly- and uniformly-convexity can be defined similarly.
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4.1 Convexity and solvability of primal problem
For primal problem (P), the following representation of J1 may help to characterize its solvability and
convexity in a direct manner.
Proposition 4.1 Let (H1)-(H3) hold. There exist two bounded self-adjoint linear operators M2 :
U1[0, T ]→ U1[0, T ], M1 : L2FT (Ω;R
n)→ L2FT (Ω;R
n) and a bounded linear operator M0 : L2FT (Ω;R
n)→
U1[0, T ] such that
J1(ξ, u1(·)) =
1
2
E
[
〈M2(u1)(·), u1(·)〉 + 〈M1(ξ), ξ〉 + 2〈M0(ξ)(·), u1(·)〉
]
, (16)
with
M2(u1)(·) = R
1
11(·)u1(·)−B
⊤
1 (·)g1(u1)(·), M1(ξ) = G1ξ + g2(T ), M0(ξ)(·) = −B
⊤
1 (·)g2(·),
where g1, g2 depending on u1 and ξ respectively, are defined through the following BFSDEs
dY1 =
[
−A⊤Y1 +Q2X1
]
ds+
[
− C⊤Y1 + S2Z1
]
dW (s),
dX1 =
[
AX1 +B1u1 +B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 Y1 + CZ1
]
ds+ Z1dW (s),
dg1 = −
[
A⊤g1 −Q2h1 −Q1X1
]
ds−
[
C⊤g1 − S2q1 − S1Z1
]
dW (s),
dh1 =
[
Ah1 +B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 g1 + Cq1
]
ds+ q1dW (s),
Y1(0) = H2X1(0), X1(T ) = 0, g1(0) = H1X1(0) +H2h1(0), h1(T ) = 0,
(17)

dY2 =
[
−A⊤Y2 +Q2X2
]
ds+
[
− C⊤Y2 + S2Z2
]
dW (s),
dX2 =
[
AX2 +B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 Y2 + CZ2
]
ds+ Z2dW (s),
dg2 = −
[
A⊤g2 −Q2h2 −Q1X2
]
ds−
[
C⊤g2 − S2q2 − S1Z2
]
dW (s),
dh2 =
[
Ah2 +B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 g2 + Cq2
]
ds+ q2dW (s),
Y2(0) = H2X2(0), X2(T ) = ξ, g2(0) = H1X2(0) +H2h2(0), h2(T ) = 0.
(18)
The proof of Proposition 4.1 follows from duality of BFSDEs and readers may refer [45] for similar
representation. It follows from (16) that J1 is quadratic functional on (ξ, u1(·)) and we have the following
result concerning its convexity on constrained admissible set U(K, α, β) × U1[0, T ].
Proposition 4.2 Let (H1)-(H3) hold. Then (P) is convex iff
block operator: M ,
[
M1 M∗0
M0 M2
]
≥ 0⇐⇒ J1(ζ, v(·)) ≥ 0, ∀(ζ, v(·)) ∈ UK˜ × U1[0, T ], (19)
where M∗0(u1) = g1(T ) : U1(0, T ) 7−→ L
2
FT
(Ω;Rn) is the adjoint operator of M0(ξ) and K˜ , K − K =
{x − y : x ∈ K, y ∈ K} is the algebra difference of K (it is also convex but not necessary to be closed
unless K is compact). Moreover, (P) is uniformly convex iff for some δ > 0,
J1(ζ, v(·)) ≥ δ
[
E|ζ|2 + E
∫ T
0
|v(s)|2ds
]
, ∀(ζ, v(·)) ∈ UK˜ × U1[0, T ]. (20)
Proof For ∀(ξ, u1), (ξ′, u′1) ∈ U(K, α, β) × U1[0, T ], denote ξ
λ = λξ + (1− λ)ξ′, uλ1 = λu1 + (1 − λ)u
′
1 for
λ ∈ [0, 1], then ζ = ξ − ξ′ ∈ UK˜, v = u1 − u
′
1 ∈ U1[0, T ]. Then, by (16), J1 should be convex iff
0 ≥J1(ξ
λ, uλ1 )− λJ1(ξ, u1)− (1− λ)J1(ξ
′, u′1),
=
1
2
λ(λ − 1)
[
〈M2(v)(·), v(·)〉 + 〈M1(ζ), (ζ)〉 + 2〈M0(ζ)(·), v(·)〉
]
=λ(λ− 1)J1(ζ, v(·)).
Hence the result (19). Similar arguments apply to uniformly convexity leading to (20).
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Remark 4.1 Similar to Schur lemma, we have J1(·, ·) is strictly convex iff
M > 0⇐⇒M2 > 0, M1 −M
∗
0M
−1
2 M0 > 0⇐⇒M1 > 0, M2 −M0M
−1
1 M
∗
0 > 0.
It follows that the convexity on (ξ, u1(·)) jointly is stronger than convexity on ξ and u1(·) marginally. As
a consequence, we have the following result when K is further conic:
Corollary 4.1 Let (H1)-(H3) hold and K is closed-convex cone. Then, (P) is convex iff
J1(ζ, v1(·)) ≥ 0, ∀(ζ, v1(·)) ∈ Uaff(K) × U1[0, T ],
where aff(K) = K −K is the affine subspace generated by K.
Noticing a closed cone always contains 0 thus K˜ = aff(K) that may be a proper subset of full space Rn.
In standard LQ control literature, when the admissible controls are from full linear space, then finite-
ness of problem implies its convexity. Alternatively, when admissible controls are only from some closed-
convex proper subset, we have the following different results.
Lemma 4.1 Suppose(H1)-(H3) hold and K is a closed-convex set containing origin 0. Then, problem
(P) is finite only if J1 is nonnegative functional on UC∞(K) × U1[0, T ] where C∞(K) is the asymptotic
(recession) cone of K.
Proof First, recall that C∞(K) ⊆ K if origin 0 ∈ K hence UC∞(K) ⊆ UK. If the statement is not true,
then J1 is finite but there exists a pair (ξ
0, u01) ∈ UC∞(K) × U1[0, T ] such that J1(ξ
0, u01(·)) < 0. So,
for any k > 0, (kξ0, ku01) is also admissible (K contains 0 thus kξ
0 ∈ UC∞(K)). Thus, J1(kξ
0, ku01(·)) =
k2J1(ξ
0, u01(·)) −→ −∞ as k −→ +∞. Contradiction thus arises.
We do not discuss if above result can be strengthen to be sufficient, with some additional conditions.
However, in case K is conic, we do have the following equivalent result.
Corollary 4.2 Suppose (H1)-(H3) hold and K is closed-convex cone. Then, problem (P) is finite iff
J1 is nonnegative on UK × U1[0, T ].
Proof The necessary part follows from Lemma 4.1 by noticing C∞(K) = K when K is conic. The
sufficient part is obvious.
We point out closed-convex cone arises naturally from real applications, for example, K is positive orthant
for no shorting constraint in finance portfolio selection (see [14, 17, 28]). Combining Corollary 4.1 and
Corollary 4.2, we have the following more explicit result:
Corollary 4.3 Suppose (H1)-(H3) hold and K is closed-convex cone. Then, (P) is finite if it is convex.
We present some related remarks.
Remark 4.2 The result of Corollary 4.3 differs from standard LQ problem (see [45] pp. 287 ) where
finiteness implies convexity, but converse is not true. Also, by Proposition 4.2 and Lemma 4.1, for
general convex set K (not conic), the convexity and finiteness of problem (P) have no direct relation.
This also differs from standard LQ control where finiteness always implies convexity.
As implied by above, for (P) with general closed-convex set K, it seems lacking tractable equivalent con-
dition to characterize its finiteness. However, on the other hand, convexity is necessary to be established
when we plan to apply Lagrange multiplier to tackle the involved constraints in (P). Thus, we primarily
focus on convexity and then discuss the related solvability (that in turn implies finiteness).
By representation (16), the mapping (ξ, u1(·)) 7−→ J1(ξ, u1(·)) is Fre´chet differentiable with Fre´chet
derivative ∂J1 = (∂ξJ1, ∂uJ1) given respectively by
∂ξJ1(ξ, u1(·)) =M1(ξ) +M
∗
0(u1), ∂uJ1(ξ, u1(·)) =M2(u1) +M0(ξ). (21)
When (P) is convex, we have the following solvability result.
Lemma 4.2 If (P) is convex, then it is (uniquely) solvable iff there exists a (unique) minimizer (ξ¯, u¯1(·))
satisfying
〈∂J1(ξ¯, u¯1(·)), (ξ − ξ¯, u1 − u¯1)〉 ≥ 0⇐⇒
{
〈M1(ξ¯) +M
∗
0(u¯1), ξ − ξ¯〉 ≥ 0,
M2(u¯1) +M0(ξ¯) = 0,
(22)
∀(ξ, u1(·)) ∈ U(K, α, β)×U1[0, T ]. If (P) is further strictly convex, then its minimizer(s), if exist, should
be unique.
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The above criteria is called first-order regularity condition for (global) optimality which is rather con-
structive. A more direct and checkable condition for existence is as follows.
Proposition 4.3 If (P) is uniformly convex on (ξ, u1), then it admits an unique minimizer.
Proof We assume U(K˜, α, β) is not empty (otherwise, (P) becomes trivial), thus there exists (ξ0, u01)
satisfying −∞ < J1(ξ0, u01). If J1 is uniformly convex, it should also be coercive, that is, J1(ξ, u1) −→ +∞
as ||(ξ, u1)|| −→ +∞. To see this point, actually we have
J1(ξ, u1) = J1(ξ
0, u01) + J1(ξ − ξ
0, u1 − u
0
1)
+
[
〈M2(u1 − u
0
1)(·), u
0
1(·)〉+ 〈M1(ξ − ξ
0), ξ0〉+ 〈M0(ξ
0), u1 − u
0
1)〉+ 〈u
0
1,M0(ξ − ξ
0)〉
]
≥ J1(ξ
0, u01) + δ||(ξ − ξ
0, u1 − u
0
1)||
2 −
||M2||2 + ||M1||2 + ||M0||2
µ
||(ξ − ξ0, u1 − u
0
1)||
2 −
µ
2
||(ξ0, u01)||
2
≥ J1(ξ
0, u01) +
δ
2
||(ξ − ξ0, u1 − u
0
1)||
2 −
µ
2
||(ξ0, u01)||
2,
for sufficiently large µ > 0. Therefore, J1(ξ, u1) −→ +∞ as ||(ξ, u1)|| −→ +∞. Note that Proposition
4.3 can only applied to (ξ − ξ0, u1 − u01) ∈ UK˜ × U1[0, T ] for uniformly convexity. In general, (ξ, u1) or
(ξ0, u01) /∈ UK˜ × U1[0, T ].
Moreover, because J1 is a proper quadratic functional with M0,M1,M2 being linear bounded op-
erators thus J1(·, ·) is also continuous (thus, lower semi-continuous (lsc)). By [13], a lsc convex coercive
functional admits at least one minimizer. Moreover, the uniform convexity of J1 implies strict convexity
thus (P) admits a unique minimizer.
We now discuss condition under which problem (P) becomes convex. First introduce the following
standard assumption
(SA-2): G1 ≫ 0, H1 ≥ 0, Q1(·) ≥ 0, S1(·) ≥ 0, R
1
11(·)≫ 0.
Second, a more general sufficient condition to convexity is via the following stochastic Riccati equation
(denoted by (SRE-2)):
(SRE-2) :

dPL = −
[
A⊤PL + PLA+ C
⊤PLC+Q+ ΛLC+ C
⊤ΛL −
(
B⊤PL + D
⊤PLC+ D
⊤ΛL
)⊤
K−1
(
B⊤PL + D
⊤PLC+ D
⊤ΛL
)]
ds+ ΛLdW (s),
PL(T ) =
(
0 0
0 G1
)
,
K(s) , R(s) + D⊤(s)PL(s)D(s) > 0,
where
A =
(
−A⊤ Q2
B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 A
)
,B =
(
0 0
B1 C
)
,C =
(
−C⊤ 0
0 0
)
,D =
(
0 S2
0 I
)
,Q =
(
0 0
0 Q1
)
,R =
(
R111 0
0 S1
)
.
We have the following result concerning convexity and its proof is given in the Appendix, Section 7.2.
Proposition 4.4 Suppose (SRE-2) has a solution (PL(·),ΛL(·)) ∈ L∞F (0, T ; S
n)×L2
F
(0, T ; Sn) such that(
0 0
0 H1
)
+ PL(0) ≥ 0.
Then, J1(·, ·) is a convex functional with (ξ, u1(·)) over L2FT (Ω;R
n) × U1[0, T ]. In particular, under
(SA-2), J1(·, ·) is uniformly convex over L2FT (Ω;R
n)× U1[0, T ].
Proposition 4.3 only specifies the existence of optimal solution to (P) but does not discuss how to char-
acterize such solution. This will be discussed below through some Lagrange multiplier method to (P).
Our target is to remove the affine-expectation constraint and only keep pointwise constraint.
Further study of (P) involves some Lagrange duality for which we need first address the relevant
feasibility, as given below.
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4.2 Feasibility of problem (P) constraints
Recall problem (P) involves two (pointwise, affine-expectation) constraints, thus it is necessary to discuss
their joint feasibility. To start, for any convex-closed proper subset K ⊂ Rn, we can introduce its support
functional: h∗K(p) , supx∈K〈p, x〉 ∈ [0,+∞]. Its effective domain (i.e., {p : h
∗
K(p) < +∞}) is B(K), the
barrier cone of K. In particular, when K is convex-closed cone, then B(K) is negative polar cone of K.
Moreover, −h∗K(−p) = infx∈K〈p, x〉 and h
∗
K(p) + h
∗
K(−p) ∈ [0,+∞] is called the breadth for nonempty
K along direction p. The breadth takes value 0 iff K is subset of affine hyperplane {y : 〈y, p〉 = h∗K(p)}
which is orthogonal to p. Now, we can discuss the feasibility of constrained U(K, α, β).
We first claim the following fundamental result that is obvious in its scalar case (n = 1) but not
straightforward in vector case. A similar result may be found in [7] pp. 44.
Lemma 4.3 ∀ξ ∈ UK,Eξ ∈ K.
Proof Recall that any convex-closed set K ⊂ Rn can be equivalently defined as the intersection of all
closed half-spaces containing it, thus for a.s. ω, 〈sj , ξ(ω)〉 ≤ rj for some data (sj , rj) ∈ Rn×R from some
index set j ∈ J . By linearity of expectation, 〈sj ,Eξ〉 ≤ rj for all j ∈ J also, thus Eξ ∈ K. Another proof
is based on support functional as follows. x ∈ K iff 〈x, p〉 ≤ h∗K(p) for each vector p. Again, by linearity
of expectation, 〈Eξ, p〉 ≤ h∗K(p) for each vector p, hence Eξ ∈ K.
By Lemma 4.3, a necessary condition for U(K, α, β) being non-empty is K+α,β , K ∩H
+
α,β 6= ∅ where
H+α,β = {x ∈ R
n : 〈α, x〉 ≥ β} is one half-space delimited by the affine hyperplane Hα,β : 〈α, x〉 = β.
Further discussion of feasibility to U(K, α, β), may depend on the following alternative assumptions.
(F1)(positive breadth along α): h∗K(α) + h
∗
K(−α) > 0.
(F2)(degenerated breadth along α): h∗K(α) + h
∗
K(−α) = 0.
Depending on (F1) or (F2), we have the following feasibility results respectively.
Proposition 4.5 Under (F1), the terminal admissible set U(K, α, β) , UK
⋂
Uα,β is
• (i) nontrivial (non-empty and admitting two constraints both), if −h∗K(−α) < β < h
∗
K(α);
• (ii) trivial (being reduced to pointwise constraint UK only), if β ≤ −h∗K(−α);
• (iii) trivial (empty set), if β > h∗K(α);
• (iv) trivial (degenerated to the exposed face of K), if β = h∗K(α).
Proposition 4.6 Under (F2), the terminal admissible set U(K, α, β) , UK
⋂
Uα,β is
• (ii’) trivial (being reduced to pointwise constraint UK only), if β ≤ h∗K(α);
• (iii’) trivial as being empty, if β > h∗K(α).
The proofs of Propositions 4.5-4.6 follow from standard convex analysis, and readers may refer [38]
Chapters 4 and 5. Of course, we are more interested to the nontrivial case (i). Some related remarks are
as follows.
Remark 4.3 (a) When K is bounded (hence compact), B(K) = Rn thus −∞ < −h∗K(−α) < h
∗
K(α) <
+∞ and (i) always holds true for all affine-expectation constraint pairs (α, β) ∈ Rn× (−h∗K(−α), h
∗
K(α)).
(b) For unbounded K, its asymptotic cone provides more explicit representation of B(K) and the range
qualification to (α, β) jointly. We omit details here.
(c) Notice that (iv) above involves the exposed face. Recall for convex set K, a set F is called its
exposed face if there is a supporting hyperplane Hs,r of K such that F = Hs,r ∩ K. For unbounded K,
there have some subtle difference between exposed face and boundary of K.
It is obvious that K+α,β is convex-closed set. We can introduce UK+
α,β
= L2FT (Ω;K
+
α,β) that satisfies
UK+
α,β
⊂ U(K, α, β) by Lemma 4.3. Noticing the inclusion here is strictly proper subset by noting, say,
in scalar case, it is not very hard to construct a random variable with support on K = [0, 1] but with
expectation on [ 12 ,+∞)(i.e., α = 1, β =
1
2 ).
We continue to discuss the strict feasibility that relates to Slater qualification to be invoked. To start,
we first present some relative interior point result for pointwise constraint UK.
Proposition 4.7 The constrained set UK admits no relative interior point.
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Proof In case dimK = n, then aff(K) = aff(K+α,β) = R
n, and aff(UK) ⊇ aff(UK+
α,β
) = L2FT (Ω; aff(K
+
α,β)) =
L2FT (Ω;R
n). Then, aff(UK) = L2FT (Ω;R
n). On the other hand, for any ξ ∈ UK, we can always construct
ξ′ ∈ B(ξ, ε) ⊂ L2FT (Ω;R
n), a small ball centered at ξ with radius ε > 0, but support ξ′ ∈ Kc with positive
probability. Similar arguments can be applied to the case of dimK < n.
Based on Proposition 4.7, to apply the Lagrange multiplier method, its Slater qualification condition
holds true iff K++α,β , K ∩ H
++
α,β 6= ∅ with H
++
α,β = {x ∈ R
n : 〈α, x〉 > β} being the strict half-space
(noticing a crucial point here is that Uα,β is an inequality constraint on (linear) affine expectation).
Actually, for any y ∈ K++α,β , ξ(ω) ≡ y a.s. ∈ U(K, α, β) and satisfies the affine-expectation constraint
strictly. Conversely, if there has any random variable ξ satisfying affine-expectation constraint strictly,
and ξ ∈ UK, it is necessary to have non-empty K
++
α,β for Eξ by Lemma 4.3.
In summary to Propositions 4.5-4.7, we set the following assumption under which U(K, α, β) is non-
trivial, strictly feasible and Slater constraint qualification holds true.
(F) The triple (K, α, β) of terminal constraint parameter satisfy: −h∗K(−α) < β < h
∗
K(α).
4.3 Solution of primal problem (P) via duality
We introduce the following dual problem (D) associated to the primal (P):
(D) : Maximize K(λ) , inf
(ξ,u1(·))∈UK×U1[0,T ]
L(λ; ξ, u1(·)) subject to λ ≥ 0,
where L(λ; ξ, u1(·)) , J1(ξ, u1(·)) + λ(β − E〈α, ξ〉) is called the Lagrange functional, K(·) is called dual
function which is parallel to primal functional J1(·, ·). Dual function K(·) is always concave (even J1(·, ·)
is not convex) since it is defined by infimum operation on a family of affine functionals.
We can introduce an auxiliary problem (KT) for given λ0 ≥ 0:
(KT) : Minimize L(λ0; ξ, u1(·)) subject to (15), (ξ, u1(·)) ∈ UK × U1[0, T ].
We stress that here ξ ∈ UK instead U(K, α, β) as in (P). Now, we can introduce the following definitions
based on [38].
Definition 4.3 (Kuhn-Tucker coefficient) A Kuhn-Tucker coefficient (KT-coefficient) for problem (P)
is any λ0 ≥ 0 satisfying −∞ < K(λ0) = µp.
(KT-admissible) Problem (P) is said to be KT-admissible if it has at least one KT-coefficient.
Definition 4.3 imposes no assumption on existence of optimal solutions to primal (P), dual (D) and (KT).
Similar to (P), we can further introduce the following definitions.
Definition 4.4 (a) Problem (D) is said to be finite if µd , supλ≥0K(λ) < +∞, and µd is called the
value of (D);
(b) Problem (D) is said to be (uniquely) solvable if there exists a (unique) λ∗ ≥ 0 such that µp =
K(λ∗) and λ∗ is called maximizer of (D);
(c) Problem (KT) is said to be finite if K(λ0) > −∞, and K(λ0) is the value of (KT);
(d) Problem (KT) is said to be (uniquely) solvable if there exists a (unique) (ξ, u1(·)) ∈ UK×U1[0, T ]
such that K(λ0) = L(λ0; ξ
∗, u∗1(·)) and (ξ
∗, u∗1(·)) is called minimizer of (KT).
The following relations among problem (P), (D) and (KT) are obvious.
Proposition 4.8 (a) If Problem (P) is KT-admissible, then it is finite.
(b) The values of problem (P), (D) and (KT) parameterized by λ0 ≥ 0, always satisfy: K(λ0) ≤
µd ≤ µp where µp − µd ≥ 0 is called the duality gap.
Note that (P) and (KT) in Proposition 4.8 need not to be convex. Moreover, we have the following
solvability relations among (P), (D) and (KT), which follow from convex analysis (e.g., see [38] Part VI)
and proof details are omitted here:
Lemma 4.4 (a) If Problem (P) is KT-admissible, then duality gap is 0 (namely, strong duality holds)
and problem (D) is solvable. Note here, (P) may not be convex.
(b) If (P) is KT-admissible, convex and related (KT) problem with KT-coefficient λ0 is solvable
with optimal solution set D = {(ξ¯, u¯1(·)) : K(λ0) = L(λ0; ξ¯, u¯1(·))}. Then, the subset Dp of D satisfying
complementary slackness condition: λ0(β − E〈α, ξ¯〉) = 0, is the optimal solution set to primal (P).
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Remark 4.4 We remark that in (a) above, problem (P) and (KT) may not be solvable even (D) is
solvable. Also, in (b), (KT) solvability does not imply solvability of (P), conversely, solvability of primal
(P) does not imply it is KT-solvable or even KT-admissible.
Part (b) of Lemma 4.4 specifies some sufficient condition to find all optimal solutions to primal problem
(P). In usual cases, we are more interested to equivalent condition for (P) solvability, and we thus report
the following result which proof can be referred from [38] Part VI.
Theorem 4.1 Assume (H1)-(H3) and suppose (P) is convex, then the following three statements : (i),
(ii), and (iii) are equivalent :
(i): (P) is KT-admissible with coefficient λ0, and (P) is solvable with minimizer (ξ
∗, u∗1(·));
(ii): The triple (λ0; ξ
∗, u∗1(·)) ∈ [0,+∞)× UK × U1[0, T ] satisfies the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) system:
β ≤ E〈α, ξ¯〉, λ¯(β − E〈α, ξ¯〉) = 0; K(λ0) = L(λ0; ξ¯, u¯1(·)); (23)
(iii): The triple (λ0; ξ
∗, u∗1(·)) is a saddle point for Lagrange functional L:
L(λ; ξ¯, u¯1(·)) ≤ L(λ¯; ξ¯, u¯1(·)) ≤ L(λ¯; ξ, u1(·)).
In Theorem 4.1, the KT-admissible and its coefficient λ0 plays some crucial role. Thus, we present some
sufficient condition ensuring them.
Proposition 4.9 Assume (H1)-(H3), and suppose problem (P) is convex, finite. Moreover, suppose
feasibility condition (F) holds true, then (P) is KT-admissible for some λ0 ≥ 0.
Proof When (F) holds true, then (P) satisfies the Slater qualification condition hence it is also KT-
admissible by [38, Corollary 28.2.1], considering (P) is finite and convex. Hence the result.
Noticing assumption (F) is crucial in above and the following example indicates it can usually be expected.
We just present its scalar case for illustration, and the vector case can be constructed similarly.
Example 4.1 In case n = 1, suppose β
α
∈ Ko, where Ko is the interior of K. Then, (F) holds.
Introduce the following assumption:
(H4) G1 > 0. R
1
11(·) is invertible and (R
1
11(·))
−1 ∈ L∞
F
(0, T ;Rm1).
Lemma 4.5 Let (H1)-(H4) hold and (P) is convex. Then, (KT) parameterized by coefficient λ ≥ 0
is (uniquely) solvable iff the following BFSDEs
(BFSDE-1) :

dg = −
[
A⊤g −Q1X¯ −Q2h
]
ds−
[
C⊤g − S1Z¯ − S2q
]
dW (s),
dY¯ =
[
−A⊤Y¯ +Q2X¯
]
ds+
[
− C⊤Y¯ + S2Z¯
]
dW (s),
dX¯ =
[
AX¯ +B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 g +B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 Y¯ + CZ¯
]
ds+ Z¯dW (s),
dh =
[
Ah+B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 g + Cq
]
ds+ qdW (s),
g(0) = H1X¯(0) +H2h(0), Y¯ (0) = H2X¯(0),
X¯(T ) = ProjK
[
G−11 (−g(T ) + λα)
]
, h(T ) = 0,
admits a (unique) solution (Y¯ , g, X¯, Z¯, h, q) ∈ L2
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];Rn))×L2
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];Rn))×L2
F
(0, T ;Rn)×
L2
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];Rn))×L2
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];Rn))×L2
F
(0, T ;Rn), where ProjK(·) is the projection mapping from
Rn to closed-convex set K under the norm |x|2G1 , 〈G
1
2
1 x,G
1
2
1 x〉. In this case, the (unique) minimizer
(ξ¯, u¯1(·)) to (KT) with coefficient λ is given by
(ξ¯, u¯1(·)) =
(
ProjK
[
G−11 (−g(T ) + λα)
]
, (R111(·))
−1B⊤1 (·)g(·)
)
.
Proof Note that (P) is convex, then for any λ ≥ 0, the Lagrange functional L(λ; ξ, u1(·)) thus (KT) are
also convex. Similar to Proposition 4.1, we have that
L(λ; ξ, u1(·)) =
1
2
E
[
〈M2(u1)(·), u1(·)〉 + 〈M1(ξ)− 2λα, ξ〉+ 2〈ξ,M
∗
0(u1(·))〉 + 2λβ
]
.
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Consequently, similar to Lemma 4.2, problem (KT) is solvable iff there exists a pair (ξ∗, u∗1(·)) satisfying{
〈M1(ξ
∗)− λα+M∗0(u
∗
1), ξ
∗ − ξ1〉 ≤ 0, ∀ξ1 ∈ UK,
M2(u
∗
1) +M0(ξ
∗) = 0.
(24)
Let (ξ¯, u¯1(·)) be an optimal control, by (24), we have{
E〈−g1(T )− g2(T ) + λα−G1ξ¯, ξ1 − ξ¯〉 ≤ 0, ∀ξ1 ∈ UK,
R111(s)u¯1(s)−B
⊤
1 (s)g1(s)−B
⊤
1 (s)g2(s) = 0,
(25)
where (Y1, g1, X1, Z1, h1, q1) and (Y2, g2, X2, Z2, h2, q2) are the solutions of (17) and (18) corresponding
to (ξ¯, u¯1), respectively. Let
Y¯ = Y1 + Y2, X¯ = X1 +X2, Z¯ = Z1 + Z2, g = g1 + g2, h = h1 + h2, q = q1 + q2,
and it follows that (Y¯ , g, X¯, Z¯, h, q) satisfying (BFSDE-1). Under (H4), it follows from (25) that
u¯1(·) = (R
1
11(·))
−1B⊤1 (·)g(·),
and
E
〈
G
1
2
1 [G
−1
1 (−g(T ) + λα)− ξ¯], G
1
2
1 (ξ1 − ξ¯)
〉
≤ 0, ∀ξ1 ∈ UK.
Note that | · |G1 is equivalent to the Euclidean norm. Let ξ1 = ProjK[G
−1
1 (−g(T ) + λα)], then by
Propositions 4.1 and 4.3 in [15], we have
E
∣∣∣ProjK[G−11 (−g(T ) + λα)]− ξ¯∣∣∣2
G1
≤ E
〈
G
1
2
1 [G
−1
1 (−g(T ) + λα)− ξ¯], G
1
2
1 (ξ1 − ξ¯)
〉
≤ 0.
Thus, we get
ξ¯ = ProjK
[
G−11 (−g(T ) + λα)
]
.
The uniqueness follows from the uniqueness of the solution of (BFSDE-1).
Combing Theorem 4.1, Proposition 4.9 and Lemma 4.5, we have
Theorem 4.2 Let (H1)-(H4) hold. Suppose (F) hold and (P) is convex and finite, then (P) is KT-
admissible with some coefficient λ0 ≥ 0. Moreover, (P) is (uniquely) solvable with an (the) optimal
solution (ξ¯, u¯1(·)) iff there exist a (unique) 7-tuple (λ; Y¯ , g, X¯, Z¯, h, q) satisfying both (BFSDE-1) and
(KKT) system:
complimentary slackness: λ
(
β − E
〈
α,ProjK
[
G−11 (−g(T ) + λα)
]〉)
= 0;
primal- and dual-constraint: λ ≥ 0; β ≤ E
〈
α,ProjK
[
G−11 (−g(T ) + λα)
]〉
.
(26)
In this case, λ is a (the) KT-coefficient of (P), and an (the) optimal solution to problem (P) is given
by
(ξ¯, u¯1(·)) =
(
ProjK
[
G−11 (−g(T ) + λα)
]
, (R111(·))
−1B⊤1 (·)g(·)
)
.
As a corollary, we have
Corollary 4.4 Let (H1)-(H4) and (F) hold true. Suppose (P) is uniformly convex, then it admits a
unique optimal solution (ξ¯, u¯1(·)) =
(
ProjK
[
G−11 (−g(T )+λα)
]
, (R111(·))
−1B⊤1 (·)g(·)
)
with (λ; Y¯ , g, X¯, Z¯, h, q)
is the unique solution for system (BFSDE-1) and (KKT) system.
4.4 Some special cases
This subsection will consider two special cases of problem (P) with more detailed analysis.
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4.4.1 Pointwise constraint
This subsection considers the case with only pointwise constraint UK. In this special case, Problem (P)
now assumes the following form
(P1): Minimize J1(ξ, u1(·)) subject to (15), (ξ, u1(·)) ∈ UK × U1[0, T ].
By Lemma 4.5, we have the following result.
Corollary 4.5 Let (H1)-(H4) hold and (P1) is convex. Then (P1) admits an (unique) optimal control
(ξ¯, u¯1(·)) iff the following BFSDEs
(BFSDE-2) :

dg = −
[
A⊤g −Q1X¯ −Q2h
]
ds−
[
C⊤g − S1Z¯ − S2q
]
dW (s),
dY¯ =
[
−A⊤Y¯ +Q2X¯
]
ds+
[
− C⊤Y¯ + S2Z¯
]
dW (s),
dX¯ =
[
AX¯ +B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 g +B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 Y¯ + CZ¯
]
ds+ Z¯dW (s),
dh(s) =
[
Ah+B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 g + Cq
]
ds+ qdW (s),
g(0) = H1X¯(0) +H2h(0), Y¯ (0) = H2X¯(0), X¯(T ) = ProjK[−G
−1
1 g(T )], h(T ) = 0,
admits a (unique) solution (Y¯ , g, X¯, Z¯, h, q). Moreover, a (the) minimizer of (P1) is given by
(ξ¯, u¯1(·)) =
(
ProjK[−G
−1
1 g(T )], (R
1
11(·))
−1B⊤1 (·)g(·)
)
. (27)
4.4.2 Affine constraint
This subsection focus on the case with only constraint Uα,β for terminal variable ξ. In this case, (P) takes
the following form:
(P2): Minimize J1(ξ, u1(·)) subject to (15), (ξ, u1(·)) ∈ Uα,β × U1[0, T ].
By Theorem 4.2, we have the following result.
Corollary 4.6 Let (H1)-(H4) hold and suppose (P2) is convex and finite, then (P2) is KT-admissible
with some coefficient λ0 ≥ 0. Moreover, (P2) is (uniquely) solvable with an (the) optimal solution
(ξ¯, u¯1(·)) iff there exist a (unique) 7-tuple (λ; g, Y¯ , X¯, Z¯, h, q) satisfying the following BFSDEs
(BFSDE-3) :

dg = −
[
A⊤g −Q1X¯ −Q2h
]
ds−
[
C⊤g − S1Z¯ − S2q
]
dW (s),
dY¯ =
[
−A⊤Y¯ +Q2X¯
]
ds+
[
− C⊤Y¯ + S2Z¯
]
dW (s),
dX¯ =
[
AX¯ +B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 g +B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 Y¯ + CZ¯
]
ds+ Z¯dW (s),
dh =
[
Ah+B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 g + Cq
]
ds+ qdW (s),
g(0) = H1X¯(0) +H2h(0), Y¯ (0) = H2X¯(0),
X¯(T ) = G−11 (−g(T ) + λα), h(T ) = 0,
λ
(
β − E
〈
α,G−11 (−g(T ) + λα)
〉)
= 0, λ ≥ 0, β ≤ E
〈
α,G−11 (−g(T ) + λα)
〉
.
In this case, λ is a (the) KT-coefficient of (P2), and an (the) optimal solution to problem (P2) is
(ξ¯, u¯1(·)) =
(
G−11 (−g(T ) + λα), (R
1
11(·))
−1B⊤1 (·)g(·)
)
. (28)
For Corollaries 4.5 and 4.6, it follows that (BFSDE-2) and (BFSDE-3) play some key roles in determining
the optimal solution. Specifically, (BFSDE-2) is a nonlinear (because of the projection operator) fully-
coupled BFSDEs; (BFSDE-3) is a linear but constrained (because of (KKT) condition) fully-coupled
BFSDEs. Both are non-standard in BFSDEs theory. Thus, it remains a challenge to show the global
solvability of them, together with (SRE-1), (SRE-2). To this end, we study the wellposedness (existence,
uniqueness) of (BFSDE-2), (BFSDE-3), Riccati equations in Sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, respectively.
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5 Existence and uniqueness of BFSDEs and Riccati equations
5.1 Solvability of (BFSDE-2)
In this subsection, we will use the discounting method (see [36]) to study the wellposedness of (BFSDE-2).
To begin with, we first give some results for general nonlinear mean-field BFSDEs:
dY (s) = b(s, Y (s), X(s), Z(s))ds+ σ(s, Y (s), X(s), Z(s))dW (s),
− dX(s) = f(s, Y (s), X(s), Z(s))ds− ZdW (s),
Y (0) = h(X(0)), X(T ) = g(Y (T ),EY (T )).
(29)
Accordingly, the following assumptions are imposed:
(H5) There exist ρ1, ρ2 ∈ R and positive constants ki, i = 1, 2, · · · , 10 such that for all s ∈ [0, T ],
y, y1, y2, y¯1, y¯2 ∈ Rn1 , x, x1, x2, z, z1, z2 ∈ Rn2 a.s.,
(i) 〈b(s, y1, x, z)− b(s, y2, x, z), y1 − y2〉 ≤ ρ1|y1 − y2|2,
|b(s, y, x1, z1)− b(s, y, x2, z2)| ≤ k1|x1 − x2|+ k2|z1 − z2|,
(ii) 〈f(s, y, x1, z)− f(s, y, x2, z), x1 − x2〉 ≤ ρ2|x1 − x2|2,
|f(s, y1, x, z1)− f(s, y2, x, z2)| ≤ k3|y1 − y2|+ k4|z1 − z2|,
(iii) |σ(s, y1, x1, z1)− σ(s, y2, x2, z2)|2 ≤ k25 |y1 − y2|
2 + k26 |x1 − x2|
2 + k27 |z1 − z2|
2,
(iv) |h(x1)− h(x2)| ≤ k8|x1 − x2|, |g(y1, y¯1)− g(y2, y¯2)| ≤ k9|y1 − y2|+ k10|y¯1 − y¯2|,
(v) E
{
|h(0)|2 + |g(0, 0)|2 +
∫ T
0
(|b(s, 0, 0, 0)|2 + |σ(s, 0, 0, 0)|2 + |f(s, 0, 0, 0)|2)ds
}
<∞.
Now we present the main result of this section on wellposedness of mean-field BFSDEs (29). Its proof is
postponed in Appendix, Section 7.3.
Theorem 5.1 Under (H5), there exists a δ1 > 0, which depends on ρ1, ρ2, T, ki, i = 3, 4, 5, 9, 10,
such that when ki ∈ [0, δ1), i = 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, there exists a unique adapted solution (Y (·), X(·), Z(·)) ∈
L2
F
(0, T ;Rn1)×L2
F
(0, T ;Rn2)×L2
F
(0, T ;Rn2) to mean-field BFSDEs (29). Further, if 2(ρ1+ρ2) < −k24−k
2
5,
there exists a δ2 > 0, which depends on ρ1, ρ2, ki, i = 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, and is independent of T , such that when
ki ∈ [0, δ1), i = 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, there exists a unique adapted solution (Y (·), X(·), Z(·)) ∈ L2F(0, T ;R
n1) ×
L2
F
(0, T ;Rn2)× L2
F
(0, T ;Rn2) to mean-field BFSDEs (29).
In order to apply Theorem 5.1, denote Y = (g⊤, Y¯ ⊤)⊤,X = (X¯⊤, h⊤)⊤,Z = (Z¯⊤, q⊤)⊤. Rewrite
(BFSDE-2) as the following 2n× 2n-BFSDEs:
(BFSDE-2′) :

dY =
[
−
(
A 0
0 A
)⊤
Y+
(
Q1 Q2
Q2 0
)
X
]
ds+
[
−
(
C 0
0 C
)⊤
Y+
(
S1 S2
S2 0
)
Z
]
dW (s),
dX =
[(
B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2
B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 0
)
Y +
(
A 0
0 A
)
X+
(
C 0
0 C
)
Z
]
ds+ ZdW (s),
Y(0) =
(
H1 H2
H2 0
)
X(0), X(T ) = ProjK
[(
−G−11 0
0 0
)
Y(T )
]
,
where ProjK(·) =
(
ProjK(·)
Proj
Rn
(·)
)
. Now let ρ∗ = esssup0≤s≤T esssupω∈ΩΛmax(−
1
2 (A(s) + A(s)
⊤)), where
Λmax(M) is the largest eigenvalue of the matrixM . Comparing (BFSDE-2
′) with (29), by the Proposition
4.2 in [15], we can check that the parameters of (H5) can be chosen as follows:
ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ
∗, k2 = k6 = k10 = 0, k1 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣(Q1 Q2Q2 0
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ , k4 = k5 = ||C|| , k7 = ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣(S1 S2S2 0
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
k8 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣(H1 H2H2 0
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ , k3 = ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣(B1(R111)−1B⊤1 B2(R222)−1B⊤2B2(R222)−1B⊤2 0
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ , k9 = ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣(−G−11 00 0
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
For M(·) ∈ L∞
F
(0, T ;Rn×n), ‖M(·)‖ , esssup0≤s≤T esssupω∈Ω‖M(s)‖. Thus by Theorem 5.1, we have
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Theorem 5.2 Suppose that 2ρ∗ < − ||C(·)||2 . There exists a δ1 > 0, which depends on ρ∗, ki, i =
3, 4, 5, 9, such that when k1, k7, k8 ∈ [0, δ1), there exists a unique adapted solution to (BFSDE-2′).
Remark 5.1 By the definition of ρ∗, Theorem 5.2 establishes the existence and uniqueness of (BFSDE-
2) under some condition on the matrix A(·).
Combining Corollary 4.5 and Theorem 5.2, we have the following result.
Theorem 5.3 Let (H1)-(H4) and (P1) is convex. Suppose that 2ρ
∗ < − ||C(·)||2 and there exists a
δ1 > 0 depending on ρ
∗, ki, i = 3, 4, 5, 9, such that k1, k7, k8 ∈ [0, δ1). Then (P1) admits a unique optimal
control given by (27) where (Y¯ , g, X¯, Z¯, h, q) is the unique solution of (BFSDE-2).
5.2 Solvability of (BFSDE-3)
Now, we consider the solvability of (BFSDE-3) which is a standard fully-coupled BFSDEs but combining
with the (KKT) qualification condition. Hence, it becomes non-standard BFSDEs with constraint on
its terminal expectation via Lagrange variable λ involved. In this sense, we may call it terminal-mean-
constrained BFSDEs. To our knowledge, such class of BFSDEs has not been well studied and this
sections aims some essential endeavor to it. To this end, we may first rewrite (BFSDE-3) as the following
2n× 2n-BFSDEs (with same notations to (BFSDE-2)):
(BFSDE-3′) :

dY = −
[(
A 0
0 A
)⊤
Y−
(
Q1 Q2
Q2 0
)
X
]
dt−
[(
C 0
0 C
)⊤
Y−
(
S1 S2
S2 0
)
Z
]
dW (s),
dX =
[(
B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2
B2R
2
22
−1
B⊤2 0
)
Y+
(
A 0
0 A
)
X+
(
C 0
0 C
)
Z
]
ds+ ZdW (s),
Y(0) =
(
H1 H2
H2 0
)
X(0), X(T ) =
(
G−11 0
0 0
)(
−Y(T ) + λ
(
α
0
))
,
λ
(
β − E
〈(
α
0
)
,
(
G−11 0
0 0
)(
−Y(T ) + λ
(
α
0
))〉)
= 0, λ ≥ 0,
β − E
〈(
α
0
)
,
(
G−11 0
0 0
)(
−Y(T ) + λ
(
α
0
))〉
≤ 0.
By the first slackness condition of (KKT) system, there arise two cases with λ = 0 or λ =
(
β +
E
〈(
α
0
)
,
(
G−11 0
0 0
)
Y(T )
〉)(
E〈α,G−11 α〉
)−1
. We have the following more detailed analysis along these
two cases.
5.2.1 Multiplier λ = 0
In this case, (BFSDE-3′) takes the following form:
dY = −
[(
A 0
0 A
)⊤
Y−
(
Q1 Q2
Q2 0
)
X
]
dt−
[(
C 0
0 C
)⊤
Y−
(
S1 S2
S2 0
)
Z
]
dW (t),
dX =
[(
B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2
B2R
2
22
−1
B⊤2 0
)
Y+
(
A 0
0 A
)
X+
(
C 0
0 C
)
Z
]
ds+ ZdW (s),
Y(0) =
(
H1 H2
H2 0
)
X(0), X(T ) = −
(
G−11 0
0 0
)
Y(T ),
β + E
〈(
α
0
)
,
(
G−11 0
0 0
)
Y(T )
〉
≤ 0. primal constraint in (KKT)
(30)
We will use Riccati decoupling method to study the wellposedness of (30). Define Y˜ = Y−
(
H1 H2
H2 0
)
X,
therefore, Y˜(0) = 0 and
X(T ) =−
(
G−11 0
0 0
)
Y(T ) = −
(
G−11 0
0 0
)
Y˜(T )−
(
G−11 H1 G
−1
1 H2
0 0
)
X(T ).
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If det
[
I +G−11 H1
]
6= 0, then the matrix
(
I +G−11 H1 G
−1
1 H2
0 I
)
is invertible, and consequently,
X(T ) = G˜Y˜(T ),
where
G˜ = −
(
I +G−11 H1 G
−1
1 H2
0 I
)−1(
G−11 0
0 0
)
= −
(
(I +G−11 H1)
−1G−11 0
0 0
)
.
Therefore, if det
[
I +G−11 H1
]
6= 0, after some manipulations, we have
dY˜ =−
[
A˜Y˜+ B˜X+ C˜Z
]
dt−
[
A˜1Y˜+ B˜1X+ C˜1Z
]
dW (t),
dX =
[
ÂY˜+ B̂X+ ĈZ
]
dt+ ZdW (t),
Y˜(0) =0, X(T ) = G˜Y˜(T ),
(31)
where
A˜ =
(
A⊤ +H1B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 +H2B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 H1B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2
H2B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 A
⊤ +H2B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2
)
,
B˜ =
(
B˜11 B˜12
B˜21 B˜22
)
,
B˜11 = −Q1 +H1A+A
⊤H1 +H1B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 H1 +H2B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 H1 +H1B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 H2,
B˜12 = −Q2 +H2A+A
⊤H2 +H1B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 H2 +H2B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 H2,
B˜21 = −Q2 +H2A+A
⊤H2 +H2B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 H1 +H2B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 H2,
B˜22 = H2B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 H2,
C˜ =
(
H1C H2C
H2C 0
)
, A˜1 =
(
C 0
0 C
)⊤
, B˜1 =
(
C⊤H1 C
⊤H2
C⊤H2 0
)
,
C˜1 = −
(
S1 −H1 S2 −H2
S2 −H2 0
)
, Â =
(
B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2
B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 0
)
,
B̂ =
(
A+B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 H1 +B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 H2 B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 H2
B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 H1 A+B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 H2
)
, Ĉ =
(
C 0
0 C
)
.
(32)
Note that Â, B˜ are symmetric and B̂ = A˜⊤, Ĉ = A˜⊤1 , C˜ = B˜
⊤
1 .
Remark 5.2 Since G−11 is symmetric, it follows from [44] that (I + G
−1
1 H1)
−1G−11 is symmetric, i.e.,
G˜ is symmetric.
Suppose the following linear relation holds true,
X(s) = P˜ (s)Y˜(s) + p˜(s), s ∈ [0, T ], a.s. (33)
If det
[
I +G−11 H1
]
6= 0, (30) is solvable if the following stochastic Riccati equation and BSDE are solvable
dP˜ =
{
Â+ B̂P˜ + P˜ A˜+ P˜ B˜P˜ + Λ˜
(
A˜1 + B˜1P˜
)
+
(
Ĉ + P˜ C˜ + Λ˜C˜1
)(
I + P˜ C˜1
)−1
[
Λ˜ − P˜
(
A˜1 + B˜1P˜
)]}
ds+ Λ˜dW (s),
P˜ (T ) = G˜,
det
[
I + P˜ C˜1
]
6= 0,
(34)
and 
dp˜ =
{[
B̂ + P˜ B˜ + Λ˜B˜1 − (Ĉ + P˜ C˜ + Λ˜C˜1)(I + P˜ C˜1)
−1P˜ B˜1
]
p˜
+ (Ĉ + P˜ C˜ + Λ˜C˜1)(I + P˜ C˜1)
−1q˜
}
ds+ q˜dW (s),
p˜(T ) =0,
(35)
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such that (KKT) in (30) is satisfied. It is easy to check that
Z = (I + P˜ C˜1)
−1[(Λ˜ − P˜ A˜1 − P˜ B˜1P˜ )Y˜− P˜ B˜1p˜+ q˜]. (36)
Next we introduce another assumption under which we will obtain some new form of (34) and (35),
(H6) det[S2 −H2] 6= 0.
Under (H6), we have det[C˜1] 6= 0, hence(
Ĉ + P˜ C˜ + Λ˜C˜1
)(
I + P˜ C˜1
)−1 [
Λ˜− P˜
(
A˜1 + B˜1P˜
)]
=
(
Λ˜ + ĈC˜−11 + P˜ C˜C˜
−1
1
)(
C˜−11 + P˜
)−1 [
Λ˜ − P˜
(
A˜1 + B˜1P˜
)]
=
(
Λ˜ +
(
C 0
0 C
)
C˜−11 + P˜
(
H1 H2
H2 0
)(
C 0
0 C
)
C˜−11
)
(C˜−11 + P˜ )
−1(
Λ˜− P˜
(
C 0
0 C
)⊤
− P˜
(
C 0
0 C
)⊤(
H1 H2
H2 0
)
P˜
)
=
(
Λ˜ +
(
I + P˜
(
H1 H2
H2 0
))(
C 0
0 C
)
C˜−11
)(
C˜−11 + P˜
)−1(
Λ˜− P˜
(
C 0
0 C
)⊤(
I +
(
H1 H2
H2 0
)
P˜
))
=
(
Λ˜−
(
I + P˜
(
H1 H2
H2 0
))(
C 0
0 C
)
P˜
)(
C˜−11 + P˜
)−1(
Λ˜− P˜
(
C 0
0 C
)⊤(
I +
(
H1 H2
H2 0
)
P˜
))
+
(
I + P˜
(
H1 H2
H2 0
))(
C 0
0 C
)(
Λ˜− P˜
(
C 0
0 C
)⊤(
I +
(
H1 H2
H2 0
)
P˜
))
=
(
Λ˜− (Ĉ + P˜ C˜)P˜
)(
C˜−11 + P˜
)−1 (
Λ˜− P˜ (Ĉ⊤ + C˜⊤P˜ )
)
+ (Ĉ + P˜ C˜)
(
Λ˜− P˜ (Ĉ⊤ + C˜⊤P˜ )
)
=
(
Λ˜− (Ĉ + P˜ C˜)P˜
)(
C˜−11 + P˜
)−1 (
Λ˜− P˜ (Ĉ⊤ + C˜⊤P˜ )
)
+ ĈΛ˜ + P˜ C˜Λ˜ − (Ĉ + P˜ C˜)P˜ (Ĉ⊤ + C˜⊤P˜ ).
Therefore, (34) and (35) take the following forms:
dP˜ =
{
Â+ B̂P˜ + P˜ B̂⊤ + P˜ B˜P˜ + Λ˜
(
Ĉ⊤ + C˜⊤P˜
)
+
(
Ĉ + P˜ C˜
)
Λ˜−
(
Ĉ + P˜ C˜
)
P˜
(
Ĉ⊤ + C˜⊤P˜
)
+
(
Λ˜−
(
Ĉ + P˜ C˜
)
P˜
)(
C˜−11 + P˜
)−1 (
Λ˜− P˜
(
Ĉ⊤ + C˜⊤P˜
))}
ds+ Λ˜dW (s),
P˜ (T ) = G˜,
det
[
I + P˜ C˜1
]
6= 0,
(37)
and 
dp˜ =
{[
B̂ + P˜ B˜ + Λ˜B˜1 − (ĈC˜
−1
1 + P˜ C˜C˜
−1
1 + Λ˜)(C˜
−1
1 + P˜ )
−1P˜ B˜1
]
p˜
+ (ĈC˜−11 + P˜ C˜C˜
−1
1 + Λ˜)(C˜
−1
1 + P˜ )
−1q˜
}
ds+ q˜dW (s),
p˜(T ) =0.
(38)
Finally, plugging (33) and (36) into (31), we have
dY˜ =−
[
A˜Y˜+ b˜
]
dt−
[
A˜1Y˜+ σ˜
]
dW (t), Y˜(0) = 0,
where
A˜ = A˜+ B˜P˜ + C˜(I + P˜ C˜1)
−1(Λ˜ − P˜ A˜1 − P˜ B˜1P˜ ),
b˜ = B˜ + P˜ p˜− C˜(I + P˜ C˜1)
−1P˜ B˜1p˜+ C˜(I + P˜ C˜1)
−1q˜,
A˜1 = A˜1 + B˜1P˜ + C˜1(I + P˜ C˜1)
−1(Λ˜− P˜ A˜1 − P˜ B˜1P˜ ),
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σ˜ = B˜1 + P˜ p˜− C˜1(I + P˜ C˜1)
−1P˜ B˜1p˜+ C˜1(I + P˜ C˜1)
−1q˜.
Therefore,
Y˜(t) = Φ(t)
∫ t
0
Φ(s)−1 [˜b(s)− A˜1(s)σ˜(s)]ds+Φ(t)
∫ t
0
Φ(s)−1σ˜(s)dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ],
where
dΦ(t) = A˜(t)Φ(t)dt + A˜1Φ(t)dW (t), Φ(0) = I.
Hence,
Y(T ) = Y˜(T )−
(
H1 H2
H2 0
)
X(T ) = Y˜(T )−
(
H1 H2
H2 0
)
G˜Y˜(T ) =
[
I −
(
H1 H2
H2 0
)
G˜
]
Y˜(T ),
and the (KKT) condition becomes
β +
〈(
α
0
)
,E
(
G−11 0
0 0
)[
I −
(
H1 H2
H2 0
)
G˜
]
Φ(T )
∫ T
0
Φ(s)−1 [˜b(s)− A˜1(s)σ˜(s)]ds
〉
+
〈(
α
0
)
,E
(
G−11 0
0 0
)[
I −
(
H1 H2
H2 0
)
G˜
]
Φ(T )
∫ T
0
Φ(s)−1σ˜(s)dW (s)
〉
=β +
〈(
α
0
)
,E
(
G−11 0
0 0
)[
I −
(
H1 H2
H2 0
)
G˜
] ∫ T
0
[
A˜(s)Y(s) + b˜(s)
]
ds
〉
≤ 0.
(39)
Proposition 5.1 Under (H1)-(H4) and (H6), suppose det
[
I +G−11 H1
]
6= 0. If (37) and (38) admit
solutions such that (39) hold, then terminal-mean-constrained BFSDEs (30) is solvable.
In case with deterministic coefficients, (39) takes the following form
β +
〈(α
0
)
,
(
G−11 0
0 0
)[
I −
(
H1 H2
H2 0
)
G˜
] ∫ T
0
[A˜(s)EY˜(s) + b˜(s)
]
ds
〉
≤ 0.
Let the fundamental solution matrices of ordinary differential equation (ODE)
dϕ˜ = −A˜ϕ˜dt, ϕ˜(0) = I,
be Φ˜(t, 0). Then
EY˜(t) = −Φ˜(t, 0)
∫ t
0
Φ˜(s, 0)˜b(s)ds.
Therefore, the condition (39) becomes
β +
〈(
α
0
)
,
(
G−11 0
0 0
)[
I −
(
H1 H2
H2 0
)
G˜
] ∫ T
0
[
− A˜(s)Φ˜(s, 0)
∫ s
0
Φ˜(r, 0)˜b(r)dr + b˜(s)
]
ds
〉
≤ 0.
(40)
Corollary 5.1 Under (H1)-(H4) and (H6), suppose det
[
I +G−11 H1
]
6= 0. If (37) and (38) admit
solutions such that (40) hold, then terminal-mean-constrained BFSDEs (30) is solvable.
5.2.2 Multiplier λ > 0
In this section, we need to assume that the coefficients are deterministic, i.e., A,B1, B2, C, G1,Q1, Q2,S1,S2,R
1
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and R222 are deterministic because the BFSDEs now takes some mean-field type form and its expectation
21
is required to be computed. In this case, (BFSDE-3′) take the following form:
dg = −
[
A⊤g −Q1X¯ −Q2h
]
ds−
[
C⊤g − S1Z¯ − S2q
]
dW (s),
dY¯ =
[
−A⊤Y¯ +Q2X¯
]
ds+
[
− C⊤Y¯ + S2Z¯
]
dW (s),
dX¯ =
[
AX¯ +B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 g +B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 Y¯ + CZ¯
]
ds+ Z¯dW (s),
dh =
[
Ah+B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 g + Cq
]
ds+ qdW (s),
g(0) = H1X¯(0) +H2h(0), Y¯ (0) = H2X¯(0),
X¯(T ) = −G−11 g(T ) +G
−1
1
β + 〈α,G−11 Eg(T )〉
〈α,G−11 α〉
α, h(T ) = 0,
β + 〈α,G−11 Eg(T )〉 > 0.
(41)
Note that (41) is solvable if and only if the following BFSDEs is solvable
dEg = −
[
A⊤Eg −Q1EX¯ −Q2Eh
]
ds,
d(g − Eg) = −
[
A⊤E(g − Eg)−Q1(X¯ − EX¯)−Q2(h− Eh)
]
ds
−
[
C⊤Eg + C⊤(g − Eg)− S1Z¯ − S2q
]
dW (s),
dEY¯ =
[
−A⊤EY¯ +Q2EX¯
]
ds,
d(Y¯ − EY¯ ) =
[
−A⊤(Y¯ − EY¯ ) +Q2(X¯ − EX¯)
]
ds+
[
− C⊤EY¯ − C⊤(Y¯ − EY¯ ) + S2Z¯
]
dW (s),
dEX¯ =
[
B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 Eg + B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 EY¯ +AEX¯ + CEZ¯
]
ds,
d(X¯ − EX¯) =
[
B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 (g − Eg) +B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 (Y¯ − EY¯ ) +A(X¯ − EX¯) + CZ¯ − CEZ¯
]
ds+ Z¯dW (s),
dEh =
[
B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 Eg +AEh+ CEq
]
ds,
d(h− Eh) =
[
B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 (g − Eg) +A(h− Eh) + Cq − CEq
]
ds+ qdW (s),
Eg(0) = H1EX¯(0) +H2Eh(0), g(0)− Eg(0) = H1(X¯(0)− EX¯(0)) +H2(h(0)− Eh(0)),
EY¯ (0) = H2EX¯(0), Y¯ (0)− EY¯ (0) = H2(X¯(0)− EX¯(0))
EX¯(T ) = −G−11 Eg(T ) +
G−11 αα
⊤G−11
〈α,G−11 α〉
Eg(T ) +
G−11 αβ
〈α,G−11 α〉
, X¯(T )− EX¯(T ) = −G−11 (g(T )− Eg(T )),
Eh(T ) = 0, h(T )− Eh(T ) = 0,
β + 〈α,G−11 Eg(T )〉 > 0.
Let Yˇ = (Eg⊤, (g − Eg)⊤,EY¯ ⊤, (Y¯ − EY¯ )⊤)⊤, Xˇ = (EX¯⊤, (X¯ − EX¯)⊤,Eh⊤, (h − Eh)⊤)⊤ and Zˇ =
(0, Z¯⊤, 0, q⊤)⊤, we have 
dYˇ = −[AˇYˇ + BˇXˇ ]dt− [Aˇ1Yˇ + Bˇ1Zˇ]dW,
dXˇ = [Aˇ2Yˇ + Bˇ2Xˇ + Cˇ2Zˇ + Dˇ2EZˇ]dt+ ZˇdW,
Yˇ (0) = HˇXˇ(0), Xˇ(T ) = GˇYˇ (T ) + fˇ ,
β + 〈α, (G−11 0 0 0)EYˇ (T )〉 > 0,
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where
Aˇ =

A⊤ 0 0 0
0 A⊤ 0 0
0 0 A⊤ 0
0 0 0 A⊤
 , Bˇ =

−Q1 0 −Q2 0
0 −Q1 0 −Q2
−Q2 0 0 0
0 −Q2 0 0
 , Aˇ1 =

0 0 0 0
C⊤ C⊤ 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 C⊤ C⊤
 ,
Bˇ1 =

0 0 0 0
0 −S1 0 −S2
0 0 0 0
0 −S2 0 0
 , Aˇ2 =

B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 0 B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 0
0 B1(R
1
11)
−1B⊤1 0 B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2
B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 0 0 0
0 B2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 0 0
 ,
Bˇ2 =

A 0 0 0
0 A 0 0
0 0 A 0
0 0 0 A
 , Cˇ2 =

0 0 0 0
0 C 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 C
 , Dˇ2 =

0 C 0 0
0 −C 0 0
0 0 0 C
0 0 0 −C
 ,
Hˇ =

H1 0 H2 0
0 H1 0 H2
H2 0 0 0
0 H2 0 0
 , Gˇ =

−G−11 +
G
−1
1 αα
⊤G
−1
1
〈α,G−11 α〉
0 0 0
0 −G−11 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 , fˇ =

G
−1
1 αβ
〈α,G−11 α〉
0
0
0
 .
(42)
Let Yˇ = Yˇ − HˇXˇ, then Yˇ(0) = 0 and (I − GˇHˇ)Xˇ(T ) = GˇYˇ(T ) + fˇ . Suppose det[I + (G−11 −
G
−1
1 αα
⊤G
−1
1
〈α,G−11 α〉
)H1] 6= 0, det[I +G
−1
1 H1] 6= 0, then det[I − GˇHˇ ] 6= 0. Hence
dYˇ = −[AˇYˇ+ BˇXˇ + CˇZˇ + DˇEZˇ]dt− [Aˇ1Yˇ+ Bˇ1Xˇ + Cˇ1Zˇ]dW,
dXˇ = [Aˇ2Yˇ+ Bˇ2Xˇ + Cˇ2Zˇ + Dˇ2EZˇ]dt+ ZˇdW,
Yˇ(0) = 0, Xˇ(T ) = (I − GˇHˇ)−1GˇYˇ(T ) + (I − GˇHˇ)−1fˇ ,
β + 〈α, (G−11 0 0 0)(EYˇ(T ) + HˇEXˇ(T )〉 > 0,
where
Aˇ = Aˇ+ HˇAˇ2, Bˇ = AˇHˇ + Bˇ + HˇAˇ2Hˇ + HˇBˇ2, Cˇ = HˇCˇ2, Dˇ = HˇDˇ2, Aˇ1 = Aˇ1, Bˇ1 = Aˇ1Hˇ,
Cˇ1 = Bˇ1 + Hˇ, Aˇ2 = Aˇ2, Bˇ2 = Aˇ2Hˇ + Bˇ2, Cˇ2 = Cˇ2, Dˇ2 = Dˇ2.
(43)
Suppose Xˇ = Pˇ Yˇ+ pˇ, applying Itoˆ’s formula, we have
dXˇ =
[
− Pˇ AˇYˇ− Pˇ BˇPˇ Yˇ− Pˇ Bˇpˇ− Pˇ CˇZˇ − Pˇ DˇEZˇ
]
dt+
[
− Pˇ Aˇ1Yˇ− Pˇ Bˇ1Pˇ Yˇ− Pˇ Bˇ1pˇ− Pˇ Cˇ1Zˇ
]
dW + (dPˇ )Yˇ+ dpˇ.
Comparing the coefficients of the diffusion term, we have
−Pˇ Aˇ1Yˇ− Pˇ Bˇ1Pˇ Yˇ− Pˇ Bˇ1pˇ− Pˇ Cˇ1Zˇ = Zˇ.
If det[I + Pˇ Cˇ1] 6= 0,
EZˇ = −(I + Pˇ Cˇ1)
−1(Pˇ Aˇ1 + Pˇ Bˇ1Pˇ )EYˇ− (I + Pˇ Cˇ1)
−1Pˇ Bˇ1pˇ.
By taking expectation and comparing the coefficients of the drift term,we have the following Riccati
equation
˙ˇP − Pˇ Aˇ− Pˇ BˇPˇ + (Pˇ Cˇ+ Pˇ Dˇ+ Cˇ2 + Dˇ2)(I + Pˇ Cˇ1)
−1(Pˇ Aˇ1 + Pˇ Bˇ1Pˇ )− Aˇ2 − Bˇ2Pˇ = 0,
Pˇ (T ) = (I − GˇHˇ)−1Gˇ,
det[I + Pˇ Cˇ1] 6= 0,
(44)
and the following backward ODE{
˙ˇp− Pˇ Bˇpˇ+ (Pˇ Cˇ+ Pˇ Dˇ+ Cˇ2 + Dˇ2)(I + Pˇ Cˇ1)
−1Pˇ Bˇ1pˇ− Bˇ2pˇ = 0,
pˇ(T ) = (I − GˇHˇ)−1fˇ .
(45)
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Moreover, we have
dEYˇ = [AEYˇ+ b]dt, EYˇ(0) = 0,
where
A = −Aˇ− BˇPˇ + (Cˇ+ Dˇ)(I + Pˇ Cˇ1)
−1(Pˇ Aˇ1 + Pˇ Bˇ1Pˇ ), b = −Bˇpˇ+ (Cˇ+ Dˇ)(I + Pˇ Cˇ1)
−1Pˇ Bˇ1pˇ.
Let the fundamental solution matrices of ODE
dϕˇ = Aϕˇdt, ϕˇ(0) = I,
be Φˇ(t, 0). Then
EYˇ(t) = Φˇ(t, 0)
∫ t
0
Φˇ(s, 0)b(s)ds.
Hence,
EYˇ (t) = (I + HˇPˇ )Φˇ(t, 0)
∫ t
0
Φˇ(s, 0)b(s)ds+ Hˇpˇ(t).
Therefore, the (KKT) condition becomes
β + 〈α, (G−11 0 0 0)(I + HˇPˇ )Φˇ(T, 0)
∫ T
0
Φˇ(s, 0)b(s)ds〉+ 〈α, (G−11 0 0 0)Hˇ(I − GˇHˇ)
−1fˇ〉 > 0. (46)
Proposition 5.2 Under (H1)-(H4), suppose det[I +(G−11 −
G
−1
1 αα
⊤G
−1
1
〈α,G−11 α〉
)H1] 6= 0, det[I +G
−1
1 H1] 6= 0.
If (44) and (45) admit solutions such that (46) hold, then (41) is solvable.
5.3 Solvability of Riccati equations
The general solvability of (SRE-1) and (SRE-2) remains widely open and we will present the solvability
for some special but nontrivial cases.
5.3.1 Deterministic coefficients case
In this subsection, we study the case that the coefficients are deterministic. In this case, (SRE-1) becomes
an ODE:
(SRE-1′) :

dP = −
[
Q2 + PA+A
⊤P − PB2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 P − PC(P + S2)
−1C⊤P
]
ds,
P (T ) =M,
P (s) + S2(s) > 0, 0 ≤ s ≤ T,
Consider the following deterministic LQ problem
Minimize J(u1(·), u2(·)) =
1
2
〈Mx(T ), x(T )〉+
1
2
∫ T
0
[
〈Q2x, x〉+
〈(
R222 0
0 K
)(
u1
u2
)
,
(
u1
u2
)〉]
ds
subject to
 dx(s) =
[
A(s)x(s) +
(
B2(s), C(s)
)(
u1(s)
u2(s)
)]
ds, s ∈ [0, T ],
x(0) = x0.
with the condition
M ≥ 0, Q2(·) ≥ 0,
(
R222(·) 0
0 K(·)
)
≫ 0. (47)
The corresponding Riccati equation is
dP = −
[
Q2 + PA+A
⊤P − PB2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 P − PC(K)
−1C⊤P
]
ds, P (T ) =M. (48)
Under the condition (47), Riccati equation (48) admits a unique solution P ∈ C(0, T ; Sn+). Denote Γ =
{K ∈ L∞(0, T ; Sˆn+)|K
−1 ∈ L∞(0, T ; Sˆn+)}. It can be checked that C(0, T ; Sˆ
n
+) ∈ Γ. Fix Q2 ∈ C(0, T ; S
n
+)
and R222 ∈ Γ. For each fixed K ∈ Γ, (48) admits a unique solution P ∈ C(0, T ; S
n
+). Thus we can define
a mapping Ψ : Γ→ C(0, T ; Sn+) as P = Ψ(K). Thus, we have the following result.
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Lemma 5.1 Riccati equation (SRE-1′) admits a solution iff there exists a K ∈ C(0, T ; Sˆn+) such that
S2 = K −Ψ(K).
Moreover, the operator Ψ(·) has the following properties.
Lemma 5.2 The operator Ψ(·) is monotonically increasing and continuous.
Proof For K, K˜ ∈ Γ, let P = Ψ(K) and P˜ = Ψ(K˜). Define Pˆ = P − P˜ , then
dPˆ = −
[
Pˆ Aˆ+ Aˆ⊤Pˆ − PˆB2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 Pˆ − PˆCK˜
−1C⊤Pˆ + Qˆ
]
ds, Pˆ (T ) = 0, (49)
where Aˆ = A − B2(R222)
−1B⊤2 P˜ − CK˜
−1C⊤P˜ , Qˆ = PC(K˜−1 − K−1)C⊤P. If K ≥ K˜ > 0, then
K˜−1 ≥ K−1 > 0, therefore Qˆ ≥ 0. Therefore, (49) admits a unique solution and Pˆ ≥ 0. Therefore, Ψ is
monotonically increasing. If K˜ → K, then by (49) and Gronwall inequality, we have Pˆ → 0.
Similar to [5, Theorem 4.6], we have the following result.
Proposition 5.3 Riccati equation (SRE-1′) admits a solution iff there exists K ∈ C(0, T ; Sˆn+) such that
S2 +Ψ(K) ≥ K.
Next we consider Riccati equation (SRE-2) which takes the following form:
(SRE-2′) :

dPL = −
[
A⊤PL + PLA+ C
⊤PLC+Q−
(
B⊤PL + D
⊤PLC
)⊤
K−1
(
B⊤PL + D
⊤PLC
)]
ds,
PL(T ) =
(
0 0
0 G1
)
,
K(s) , R(s) + D⊤(s)PL(s)D(s) > 0, 0 ≤ s ≤ T,
where A(s) =
(
−A⊤(s) Q2(s)
B2(s)(R
2
22(s))
−1B⊤2 (s) A(s)
)
, B(s) =
(
0 0
B1(s) C(s)
)
, C(s) =
(
−C⊤(s) 0
0 0
)
,
D(s) =
(
0 S2(s)
0 I
)
, Q(s) =
(
0 0
0 Q1(s)
)
, R(s) =
(
R111(s) 0
0 S1(s)
)
.
By [5, Theorem 4.6], we have the following result.
Proposition 5.4 Let Q1(·) ≥ 0, G1 ≥ 0, C = 0. If there exists K ∈ C(0, T ; S
n+m
+ ) such that
R+ D⊤Φ(K)D ≥ K,
then Riccati equation (SRE-2′) admits a solution.
5.3.2 One-dimensional case: n = m1 = m2 = 1
For Riccati equation (SRE-1) with scalar value, we have the following result.
Proposition 5.5 Let S2(·) ≥ 0 and Q2(·) ≥ 0, then Riccati equation (SRE-1) admits a unique solution
(P (·),Λ(·)) ∈ L∞
F
(0, T ;R)× L2
F
(0, T ;R).
Proof For simplicity, we only consider the case S2(·) = 0 since the proof of S2(·) > 0 is similar. Consider
the following equation:
dy = −
[
(B2)
2(R222)
−1 + (C2 − 2A)y −Q2(s)y
2 + 2Cz
]
ds+ zdW (s), y(T ) =M−1. (50)
We will show that (50) admits a unique solution (y(s), z(s)) ∈ L∞
F
(0, T ;R) × L2
F
(0, T ;R). First we will
prove the uniqueness. Let (yˇ(s), zˇ(s)) and (y˜(s), z˜(s)) be two solutions of (50) such that zˇ ·W ,
∫ ·
0 zˇdW (s)
and z˜ ·W are bounded-mean-oscillation (BMO) martingles (see [16]). Set yˆ = yˇ − y˜, zˆ = zˇ − z˜. Then
dyˆ =
[
Q2(yˇ + y˜)yˆ + (2A− C
2)yˆ − 2Czˆ
]
ds+ zˆdW, yˆ(T ) = 0.
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Applying Itoˆ’s formula to |yˆ|2 and taking conditional expectation, we deduce that there exists a constant
k > 0 such that
|yˆ(s)|2 + Es
∫ T
s
|zˆ(r)|2dr =E
[ ∫ T
s
(
− 2Q2(yˇ + y˜)yˆ
2 − (2A− C)yˆ2 + 4Cyˆzˆ
)
dr
∣∣∣Fs]
≤kE
[ ∫ T
s
|yˆ|2dr
∣∣∣Fs]+ 1
2
E
[ ∫ T
s
|zˆ|2dr
∣∣∣Fs].
Therefore,
yˇ(s) = y˜(s), zˇ(s) = z˜(s), a.e. s ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s.
Hence, BSDE (50) admits at most one solution in L∞
F
(0, T ;R)× L2
F
(0, T ;R).
Let us now prove the existence. For h(·) ∈ L∞
F
([0, T ];R), define ‖h(·)‖∞ = esssup0≤s≤T esssupω∈Ω|h(s)|.
First, introduce the following equation:
dy¯(s) = −
[
‖(B2)
2(R222)
−1‖∞ + ‖C
2 − 2A‖∞y¯ + 2Cz¯
]
ds+ z¯dW, y¯(T ) =M−1. (51)
BSDE (51) is a standard BSDE with Lipschitz continuous generator, therefore there exists a unique
solution (y¯, z¯) ∈ L2
F
(Ω;C([t, T ];R))×L2
F
(0, T ;R) and z¯ ·W is a BMO martingale. Rewrite BSDE (51) as
dy¯(s) = −
[
‖(B2)
2(R222)
−1‖∞ + ‖C
2 − 2A‖∞y¯
]
ds+ z¯
(
dW − 2Cds
)
, y¯(T ) =M−1.
Note that 2C(s) ·W is a BMO martingale, there exists a new probability measure P˜ such that W P˜s ,
Ws −
∫ s
0
2C(s)ds is a Brownian motion under P˜. Therefore,
y¯(s) = EP˜
[
e‖C
2−2A‖∞(T−s) + ‖(B2)
2(R222)
−1‖∞
∫ T
s
e‖C
2−2A‖∞(s−v)dv
∣∣∣Fs],
from which we deduce that y¯(s) ≤ c1 where c1 = e‖C
2−2A‖∞T + ‖(B2)2(R222)
−1‖∞Te‖C
2−2A‖∞T . Next,
introduce the following BSDE:
dy(s) = −
[
− ‖C2 − 2A‖∞y(s)− c1Q2y(s) + 2Cz(s)
]
ds+ z(s)dW (s), y(T ) =M−1. (52)
BSDE (52) is a standard BSDE with Lipschitz continuous generator, therefore there exists a unique
solution (y, z) ∈ L2
F
(Ω;C([t, T ];R))×L2
F
(0, T ;R) and z ·W is a BMO martingale. Rewrite BSDE (52) as
dy(s) = −
[
− ‖C2 − 2A‖∞y(s)− c1Q2y(s)
]
ds+ z(dW − 2Cds), y(T ) =M−1.
Therefore,
y(s) = EP˜
[
e−2‖C
2−2A‖∞(T−s)−c1Q2(T−s)
∣∣∣Fs],
from which we deduce that y(s) ≥ c2, where c2 = e
−2‖C2−2A‖∞T−c1Q2T .Moreover, by comparison theorem
for BSDE with Lipschitz continuous generator, for s ∈ [0, T ] we have c2 ≤ y(s) ≤ y¯(s) ≤ c1, P − a.s.
Define Θc1,c2(y) , c1I{y < c1}+ pI{c1 ≤ y ≤ c2}+ c2I{y > c2}, and introduce the following BSDE
dy = −
[
(B2)
2(R222)
−1 + (C2 − 2A)y −Q2Θc1,c2(y)y + 2Cz
]
ds+ zdW (s), y(T ) =M−1.
The above BSDE is a standard quadratic BSDE and by [24, Theorem 2.3], it admits at most one solution
(yc1,c2(s), zc1,c2(s)) ∈ L∞
F
(0, T ;R)× L2
F
(0, T ;R). Furthermore, let
f1(y, z) = (B2)
2(R222)
−1 + (C2 − 2A)y −Q2Θc1,c2(y)y + 2Cz,
f2(y, z) = ‖(B2)
2(R222)
−1‖∞ + ‖C
2 − 2A‖∞y + 2Cz,
f3(y, z) = −‖C
2 − 2A‖∞y − c1Q2y + 2Cz.
It is easy to check that there exist positive constants k1, k2, k3 such that
|f1(y, z)| ≤ k1|y|+ k2z
2 + k3,
∂f1
∂z
= 2C,
∂f1
∂y
≤ C2 − 2A−Q2c2, P− a.s.
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Moreover, we have
∀s ∈ [0, T ], f1(y¯(s), z¯(s)) ≤ f2(y¯(s), z¯(s)), f1(y(s), z(s)) ≥ f3(y(s), z(s)), P− a.s.
Hence, it follows from [24, Theorem 2.6] that
∀s ∈ [0, T ], y(s) ≤ y(s) ≤ y¯(s), P− a.s.
Therefore, (50) admits a solution (y(s), z(s)) ∈ L∞
F
(0, T ;R) × L2
F
(0, T ;R) and there exist two positive
constants c1, c2 such that
∀s ∈ [0, T ], c2 ≤ y(s) ≤ c1, P− a.s.
Let P (s) = y−1(s), K(s) = −z(s)y−2(s), we have
dP = −
[
Q2 + 2AP −B
2
2(R
2
22)
−1P 2 − (PC +K)2P−1
]
ds+KdW (s), P (T ) =M,
i.e., (SRE-1) admits a solution (P (s),K(s)) ∈ L∞
F
(0, T ;R) × L2
F
(0, T ;R). Moreover, the uniqueness of
solution of (SRE-1) follows from that of (50).  In this case, (SRE-2) is two dimensional. By [42,
Theorem 5.3], we have the following result.
Proposition 5.6 Let Q1(·) ≥ 0, G1 ≥ 0, S1(·) ≫ 0, R111(·) ≫ 0, then Riccati equation (SRE-2) admits
a unique solution (PL(·),ΛL(·)) ∈ L∞F (0, T ; S
2
+)× L
2
F
(0, T ; S2).
6 Application
To simplify presentation, we consider a financial market with only one (risk-free) bond and one (risky)
stock. Their prices P0(·), P1(·) evolve respectively:{
dP0(s) = r(s)P0(s)ds, P0(0) = p0,
dP1(s) = P1(s)[µ(s)ds+ σ(s)dW (s)], P1(0) = p1.
(53)
Here, random processes r(·), µ(·), σ(·) are respectively interest rate, risky return rate, and instantaneous
volatility. Assume that µ(s) > r(s), a.s. for any 0 ≤ s ≤ T , thus the risk premium is positive. Suppose
there involve two economic agents formulated in leader-follower decision pattern: one agent acts as leader
(it may be interpreted as firm owner or principal) wish to achieve or hedge some terminal wealth objective
ξ. It can also be interpreted as some payoff target to be replicated in pension planning. In addition, the
leader may utilize some continuous consumption process with instantaneous rate c1(·). Another agent is
the follower (e.g., pension fund manager) who may implement a dynamic operation (or, wage) process
c2(·). Thus, the state process X(s) becomes the following BSDE
dX(s) =
[
r(s)X(s) +
µ(s)− r(s)
σ(s)
Z(s)− c1(s)− c2(s)
]
ds+ Z(s)dW (s), X(T ) = ξ, (54)
where Z(s) = pi(s)σ(s) and pi(·) is the amount of risky allocation from wealth process. For i = 1, 2,
let Ui , {ci : [0, T ] × Ω → R|ci(·) is F − progressively measurable, E
∫ T
0 |ci(t)|
2dt < ∞} represent the
operation and consumption process. Also, the terminal target ξ is subject to some practical constraints
UK, Uα,β and U(K, α, β). For quadratic hedging, the following functionals are often employed (see [10]):
J1(ξ, c1(·), c2(·)) ,
1
2
E
{
G1ξ
2 +H1X
2(0) +
∫ T
0
[
Q1(s)X
2(s) + S1(s)Z
2(s) +R1(s)c
2
1(s)
]
ds
}
,
J2(ξ, c1(·), c2(·)) ,
1
2
E
{
H2X
2(0) +
∫ T
0
[
Q2(s)X
2(s) + S2(s)Z
2(s) +R2(s)c
2
2(s)
]
ds
}
,
(55)
where H1, H2 denote the initial hedging surplus index. Comparing with (1) and (3), we obtain that
A = r, B1 = B2 ≡ −1, C =
µ−r
σ
, R111 = R1, R
2
22 = R2. Thus (SRE-1) takes the following form:
dP = −
[
Q2 + 2Pr −
P 2
R2
−
(
P
µ− r
σ
+K
)2 1
P + S2
]
ds+KdW (s),
P (T ) =M 6= 0,
P (s) + S2(s) > 0, 0 ≤ s ≤ T.
(56)
Now, we give the following assumption:
27
(H7) All the coefficients in (54) and (55) are bounded. Moreover, H1 ≥ 0, Q1(·) ≥ 0, G1 > 0, S1(·) ≫
0, R1(·)≫ 0, Q2(·) ≥ 0, S2(·) ≥ 0, R2(·)≫ 0.
Note that in (H7), there has no positive (semi-)definite assumption on H2. Under (H7), It follows from
Proposition 5.5 that (56) admits a unique solution. Moreover, if P (0) + H2 ≥ 0, then by Proposition
3.3 and Theorem 3.1, the optimal consumption c¯2(·) of the follower is given by c¯2(·) = −
Y¯ (·)
R2(·)
, where
(Y¯ , X¯, Z¯) is the solution of the following BFSDEs dY¯ = (−rY¯ +Q2X¯)ds− (
µ− r
σ
Y¯ − S2Z¯)dW (s), dX¯ =
[
rX¯ − c1 +
Y¯
R2
+
µ− r
σ
Z¯
]
ds+ Z¯dW (s),
Y¯ (0) = H2X¯(0), X¯(T ) = ξ.
(57)
For the leader, (SRE-2) takes the following form:
dPL = −
[
A⊤PL + PLA+ C
⊤PLC+Q+ ΛLC+ C
⊤ΛL −
(
B⊤PL + D
⊤PLC+ D
⊤ΛL
)⊤
K−1
(
B⊤PL + D
⊤PLC+ D
⊤ΛL
)]
ds+ ΛLdW (s),
PL(T ) =
(
0 0
0 G1
)
,
K(s) , R(s) + D⊤(s)PL(s)D(s) > 0, 0 ≤ s ≤ T,
(58)
where A =
(
−r Q2
1
R2
r
)
,B =
(
0 0
−1 µ−r
σ
)
,C =
(
−µ−r
σ
0
0 0
)
,D =
(
0 S2
0 1
)
,Q =
(
0 0
0 Q1
)
,R =(
R1 0
0 S1
)
. Under (H7), it follows from Proposition 5.6 that (58) admits a unique solution. Further-
more, suppose that PL(0) +
(
0 0
0 H1
)
≥ 0 and (F) holds, it follows from Proposition 4.4 and Theorem
4.2 that an optimal control of the leader is given by (ξ¯, c¯1(·)) =
(
ProjK
[
−g(T )+λα
G1
]
,− g(·)
R1(·)
)
, where
(λ; Y¯ , g, X¯, Z¯, h, q) is the solution of the following BFSDEs
dg = (−rg +Q1X¯ +Q2h)ds− (
µ− r
σ
g − S1Z¯ − S2q)dW (s), dY¯ = (−rY¯ +Q2X¯)ds− (
µ− r
σ
Y¯ − S2Z¯)dW (s),
dX¯ =
[
rX¯ +
g
R1
+
Y¯
R2
+
µ− r
σ
Z¯
]
ds+ Z¯dW (s), dh =
[
rh+
g
R2
+
µ− r
σ
q
]
ds+ qdW (s),
g(0) = H1X¯(0) +H2h(0), Y¯ (0) = H2X¯(0), X¯(T ) = ProjK
[−g(T ) + λα
G1
]
, h(T ) = 0,
λ
(
β − αEProjK
[−g(T ) + λα
G1
])
= 0, λ ≥ 0, β ≤ αEProjK
[−g(T ) + λα
G1
]
.
(59)
6.1 Pointwise constraint
In case there has only one constraint ξ ∈ UK, (59) assumes the following form:
dg = (−rg +Q1X¯ +Q2h)ds− (
µ− r
σ
g − S1Z¯ − S2q)dW (s), dY¯ = (−rY¯ +Q2X¯)ds− (
µ− r
σ
Y¯ − S2Z¯)dW (s),
dX¯ =
[
rX¯ +
g
R1
+
Y¯
R2
+
µ− r
σ
Z¯
]
ds+ Z¯dW (s), dh =
[
rh+
g
R2
+
µ− r
σ
q
]
ds+ qdW (s),
g(0) = H1X¯(0) +H2h(0), Y¯ (0) = H2X¯(0), X¯(T ) = ProjK
[
−G−11 g(T )
]
, h(T ) = 0.
(60)
Here, the parameters of (H5) can be chosen as follows:
ρ1 = ρ2 = −essinf0≤s≤T essinfω∈Ω|r(s)|, k1 =
∥∥∥∥(Q1 Q2Q2 0
)∥∥∥∥ , k2 = k6 = k10 = 0, k3 = ∥∥∥∥(R−11 (·) R−12 (·)R−12 (·) 0
)∥∥∥∥ ,
k4 = k5 = esssup0≤s≤T esssupω∈Ω
∣∣∣∣µ(s)− r(s)σ(s)
∣∣∣∣ , k7 = ∥∥∥∥(S1 S2S2 0
)∥∥∥∥ , k8 = ∥∥∥∥(H1 H2H2 0
)∥∥∥∥ , k9 = esssupω∈ΩG−11 .
(61)
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Therefore, by Theorem 5.2, we have the following result.
Proposition 6.1 Suppose that 2ρ1 < −k24 . There exists a δ1 > 0, which depends on ρ1, ki, i = 3, 4, 9,
such that when k1, k7, k8 ∈ [0, δ1), there exists a unique adapted solution to (60).
Under (H7), suppose that PL(0) +
(
0 0
0 H1
)
≥ 0. If the conditions of Proposition 6.1 holds, the optimal
control of the leader is given by (ξ¯, c¯1(·)) =
(
ProjK
[
−g(T )
G1
]
,− g(·)
R1(·)
)
, where (Y¯ , g, X¯, Z¯, h, q) is the solution
of (60).
Next, we give a more specific condition for wellposedness of (60). For c1, c3, c4, ρ¯1 and ρ¯2, please
refer Lemma 7.2 and Lemma 7.3.
Remark 6.1 For some ε > 0, set c1 =
k1
ε
, c3 =
k3
ε
and c4 =
k4
k24+ε
. Suppose 2(ρ1 + ρ2) < −k24 − k
2
5 − 3ε
and define d = −k24 − k
2
5 − 3ε − 2ρ1 − 2ρ2 = −2k
2
4 − 3ε − 4ρ1. Therefore, we can choose ρ such that
ρ¯1 = ρ¯2 =
d
2 . In this case, let
θ =
(
1
ρ¯2
+
1
1− k4c4
+ 1
)(
k29 +
k3c3
ρ¯1
)
=
(
2
−4ρ1 − 2k24 − 3ε
+ 2 +
k24
ε
)(
k29 +
2k23
−ε(4ρ1 + 2k24 + 3ε)
)
.
That is, if
4ρ1 < −2k
2
4 − 3ε, k
2
8θ < 1, k
2
7θ < 1,
k21θ
ε
< 1, (62)
there exists a unique adapted solution to (60).
6.2 Affine constraint
In this subsection, suppose all the coefficients are deterministic. If there is only one constraint ξ ∈ Uα,β ,
(59) takes the following form:
dg = (−rg +Q1X¯ +Q2h)ds− (
µ− r
σ
g − S1Z¯ − S2q)dW (s), dY¯ = (−rY¯ +Q2X¯)ds− (
µ− r
σ
Y¯ − S2Z¯)dW (s),
dX¯ =
[
rX¯ +
g
R1
+
Y¯
R2
+
µ− r
σ
Z¯
]
ds+ Z¯dW (s), dh =
[
rh+
g
R2
+
µ− r
σ
q
]
ds+ qdW (s),
g(0) = H1X¯(0) +H2h(0), Y¯ (0) = H2X¯(0), X¯(T ) =
−g(T ) + λα
G1
, h(T ) = 0,
λ(β − αG−11 E(−g(T ) + λα)) = 0, λ ≥ 0, β − αG
−1
1 E(−g(T ) + λα) ≤ 0.
(63)
In case λ = 0, (63) becomes
dg = (−rg +Q1X¯ +Q2h)ds− (
µ− r
σ
g − S1Z¯ − S2q)dW (s), dY¯ = (−rY¯ +Q2X¯)ds− (
µ− r
σ
Y¯ − S2Z¯)dW (s),
dX¯ =
[
rX¯ +
g
R1
+
Y¯
R2
+
µ− r
σ
Z¯
]
ds+ Z¯dW (s), dh =
[
rh+
g
R2
+
µ− r
σ
q
]
ds+ qdW (s),
g(0) = H1X¯(0) +H2h(0), Y¯ (0) = H2X¯(0), X¯(T ) = −G
−1
1 g(T ), h(T ) = 0,
β + αG−11 Eg(T ) ≤ 0.
(64)
Here, we present some detailed solution.
First, note that (64) is linear and homogeneous. Thus if (64) admits an unique solution, it must be
Y¯ = g = X¯ = Z¯ = h = q ≡ 0. In this case, if β ≤ 0, (KKT) condition holds. Let ρ1, ρ2, ki, i = 1, · · · , 10
be defined as in (61). Therefore, by Theorem 5.2, suppose that 2ρ1 < −k24 and β ≤ 0, if there exists a
δ2 > 0 depending on ρ1, ki, i = 3, 4, 9, such that k1, k7, k8 ∈ [0, δ2), there exists a unique adapted solution
to (64). Therefore, under (H7), suppose that PL(0)+
(
0 0
0 H1
)
≥ 0, 2ρ1 < −k24 and β ≤ 0, if there exists
a δ2 > 0 depending on ρ1, ki, i = 3, 4, 9, such that k1, k7, k8 ∈ [0, δ2), the optimal control of the leader is
given by (ξ¯, c¯1(·)) = (0, 0).
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Next we study (64) by the result in Section 5.2.1. In this case, (34) and (35) become
dP˜ =
{
Â+ B̂P˜ + P˜ B̂⊤ + P˜ B˜P˜ −
(
Ĉ + P˜ C˜
)
P˜
(
Ĉ⊤ + C˜⊤P˜
)
+
(
Ĉ + P˜ C˜
)
P˜
(
C˜−11 + P˜
)−1
P˜
(
Ĉ⊤ + C˜⊤P˜
)}
ds,
P˜ (T ) = G˜,
det
[
I + P˜ C˜1
]
6= 0,
(65)
and  dp˜ =
[
B̂ + P˜ B˜ − (ĈC˜−11 + P˜ C˜C˜
−1
1 )(C˜
−1
1 + P˜ )
−1P˜ B˜1
]
p˜ds,
p˜(T ) =0,
(66)
where the notations of the coefficients are defined in (32). If (65) admits a solution such that P˜ ∈
L∞(0, T ;R2) and (C˜−11 + P˜ )
−1 ∈ L∞(0, T ;R2), then it is easy to see that p˜ ≡ 0. Therefore,
β +
〈(
α
0
)
,
(
G−11 0
0 0
)[
I −
(
H1 H2
H2 0
)
G˜
] ∫ T
0
[
− A˜(s)Φ˜(s, 0)
∫ s
0
Φ˜(r, 0)˜b(r)dr + b˜(s)
]
ds
〉
= β,
i.e., (KKT) condition (40) holds if β ≤ 0. Under (H7), if S2 6= H2 and G
−1
1 H1 6= −1, by Corollary 5.1,
(64) is solvable. Therefore, an optimal control of the leader is given by (ξ¯, c¯1(·)) =
(
− g(T )
G1
,− g(·)
R1(·)
)
,
where (Y¯ , g, X¯, Z¯, h, q) is the solution of (64).
Now we consider the case λ > 0. (63) becomes
dg = (−rg +Q1X¯ +Q2h)ds− (
µ− r
σ
g − S1Z¯ − S2q)dW (s), dY¯ = (−rY¯ +Q2X¯)ds− (
µ− r
σ
Y¯ − S2Z¯)dW (s),
dX¯ =
[
rX¯ +
g
R1
+
Y¯
R2
+
µ− r
σ
Z¯
]
ds+ Z¯dW (s), dh =
[
rh+
g
R2
+
µ− r
σ
q
]
ds+ qdW (s),
g(0) = H1X¯(0) +H2h(0), Y¯ (0) = H2X¯(0), X¯(T ) = −G
−1
1 g(T ) +G
−1
1 Eg(T ) +
β
α
, h(T ) = 0,
β + αG−11 Eg(T ) > 0.
(67)
Hence, (44) and (45) take the form
˙ˇP − Pˇ Aˇ− Pˇ BˇPˇ + (Pˇ Cˇ+ Pˇ Dˇ+ Cˇ2 + Dˇ2)(I + Pˇ Cˇ1)
−1(Pˇ Aˇ1 + Pˇ Bˇ1Pˇ )− Aˇ2 − Bˇ2Pˇ = 0,
Pˇ (T ) = (I − GˇHˇ)−1Gˇ,
det[I + Pˇ Cˇ1] 6= 0,
(68)
and {
˙ˇp− Pˇ Bˇpˇ+ (Pˇ Cˇ+ Pˇ Dˇ+ Cˇ2 + Dˇ2)(I + Pˇ Cˇ1)
−1Pˇ Bˇ1pˇ− Bˇ2pˇ = 0,
pˇ(T ) = (I − GˇHˇ)−1fˇ ,
(69)
where the notations of the coefficients are defined in (42). Now (KKT) condition (46) becomes
β + α(G−11 0 0 0)(I + HˇPˇ )Φˇ(T, 0)
∫ T
0
Φˇ(s, 0)b(s)ds+ α(G−11 0 0 0)Hˇ(I − GˇHˇ)
−1fˇ > 0, (70)
where Φˇ(t, 0) is the fundamental solution matrices of ODE
dϕˇ = [−Aˇ− BˇPˇ + (Cˇ+ Dˇ)(I + Pˇ Cˇ1)
−1(Pˇ Aˇ1 + Pˇ Bˇ1Pˇ )]ϕˇdt, ϕˇ(0) = 1.
Under (H7), if G−11 H1 6= −1, by Proposition 5.2, if (68) and (69) admit solutions such that (70) holds, then
(67) is solvable. Therefore, an optimal control of the leader is given by (ξ¯, c¯1(·)) =
(
−g(T )+λα
G1
,− g(·)
R1(·)
)
,
where (λ; Y¯ , g, X¯, Z¯, h, q) is the solution of (67).
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Conclusion
We discuss an open-loop backward Stackelberg differential game where the state is characterized by BSDE
and the decisions of leader consist of a static terminal-perturbation and a dynamic linear-quadratic con-
trol. The terminal control is subject to pointwise and expectation constraints. Our open-loop Stackelberg
equilibrium is represented by some coupled BFSDEs with mixed initial-terminal conditions and the global
solvability of such BFSDEs is discussed in some nontrivial cases. In our future work we will study the
wellpolsedness of (BFSDE-1) with (KKT) system (26).
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 3.3:
Before we give the proof the Proposition 3.3, first we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 7.1 For any u2(s) ∈ U2[0, T ], let (x(u2)(s), z(u2)(s)) be the solution of
dx(u2)(s) =
[
A(s)x(u2)(s) +B2(s)u2(s) + C(s)z
(u2)(s)
]
ds+ z(u2)(s)dW (s), x(u2)(T ) = 0.
Then for any Θ(·) ∈ L∞
F
(0, T ;Rm2×n), there exists a constant L > 0 such that
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣u2(s)−Θ(s)x(u2)(s)∣∣∣2ds ≥ LE∫ T
0
|u2(s)|
2ds, ∀u2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ]. (71)
Proof Let Θ(·) ∈ L∞
F
(0, T ;Rm2×n), define a bounded linear operator L : U2[0, T ] → U2[0, T ] by Lu2 =
u2 − Θx(u2). Then L is a bijection, and its inverse is given by L−1u2 = u2 + Θx˜(u2), where X˜(u2)(s) is
the solution of
dx˜(u2)(s) =
[
A(s)x˜(u2)(s) +B2(s)(Θ(s)x˜
(u2)(s) + u2(s)) + C(s)z˜
(u2)(s)
]
ds+ z˜(u2)(s)dW (s), x˜(u2)(T ) = 0.
By the bounded inverse theorem, L−1 is bounded with norm ‖L−1‖ > 0. Therefore,
E
∫ T
0
|u2(s)|
2ds ≤‖L−1‖E
∫ T
0
|Lu2(s)|
2ds = ‖L−1‖E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣u2(s)−Θ(s)x(u2)(s)∣∣∣2ds. 
Now we will give the proof of Proposition 3.3. First, let
Γ , −
(
Q2 + PA+A
⊤P − (PC +K)(P + S2)
−1(C⊤P +K)− PB2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 P
)
.
Let processes P (·) satisfy the following equations
dP (s) = Γ(s)ds+K(s)dW (s), P (T ) =M−1.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to 〈Px, x〉, integrating from 0 to T , we have
− E〈P (0)x(0), x(0)〉 = E
∫ T
0
[
〈(Γ + PA+A⊤P )x, x〉 + 2〈x, PB2u2〉+ 〈Pz, z〉+ 2〈(PC +K)z, x〉
]
ds.
Therefore,
J(u2(·)) =E〈H2x(0), x(0)〉+ E
∫ T
0
[
〈Q2x, x〉+ 〈S2z, z〉+ 〈R
2
22u2, u2〉
]
ds+ E〈P (0)x(0), x(0)〉
+ E
∫ T
0
[
〈(Γ + PA+A⊤P )x, x〉 + 2〈x, PB2u2〉〈Pz, z〉+ 2〈(PC +K)z, x〉
]
ds.
First, consider the terms involving u2,
〈R222u2, u2〉+ 2〈x, PB2u2〉 =
〈
R222
(
u2 + (R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 Px
)
, u2 + (R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 Px
〉
−
〈
x, PB2(R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 Px
〉
.
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Next, consider the terms involving z,
〈S2z, z〉+ 〈Pz, z〉+ 2〈(PC +K)z, x〉
=
〈
(P + S2)
(
z + (P + S2)
−1(C⊤P +K)x
)
, z + (P + S2)
−1(C⊤P +K)x
〉
−
〈
x, (PC +K)(P + S2)
−1(C⊤P +K)x
〉
.
Therefore,
J(u2(·)) =E
〈
(H2 + P (0))x(0), x(0)〉
〉
+ E
∫ T
0
〈
R222
(
u2 + (R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 Px
)
, u2 + (R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 Px
〉
ds
+ E
∫ T
t
〈
(P + S2)
(
z + (P + S2)
−1(C⊤P +K)x
)
, z + (P + S2)
−1((C⊤P +K)x
〉
ds ≥ 0.
Moreover, if R222(·) ≥ δI, then it follows from Lemma 7.1 that
J (u2(·)) ≥ δE
∫ T
0
〈
u2 + (R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 Px, u2 + (R
2
22)
−1B⊤2 Px
〉
ds ≥ δγE
∫ T
0
∣∣∣u2(s)∣∣∣2ds. 
7.2 Proof of Proposition 4.4:
For simplicity, let
Γ = −
(
Q+ PLA+ ΛC+ C
⊤Λ + A⊤PL + C
⊤PLC
− (B⊤PL + D
⊤Λ + D⊤PLC)
⊤(R+ D⊤PLD)
−1(B⊤PL + D
⊤Λ + D⊤PLC)
)
.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to
〈
PL
(
Y
X
)
,
(
Y
X
)〉
, we have
d
〈
PL
(
Y
X
)
,
(
Y
X
)〉
=
〈
PLA
(
Y
X
)
+ PLB
(
u1
Z
)
,
(
Y
X
)〉
ds+
〈
Γ
(
Y
X
)
,
(
Y
X
)〉
ds+
〈
ΛC
(
Y
X
)
+ ΛD
(
u1
Z
)
,
(
Y
X
)〉
ds
+
〈
PL
(
Y
X
)
,A
(
Y
X
)
+ B
(
u1
Z
)〉
ds+
〈
Λ
(
Y
X
)
,C
(
Y
X
)
+ D
(
u1
Z
)〉
ds
+
〈
PL
(
C
(
Y
X
)
+ D
(
u1
Z
))
,C
(
Y
X
)
+ D
(
u1
Z
)〉
ds+ [· · · ]dW (s).
Thus,
E
〈
PL(T )
(
Y (T )
X(T )
)
,
(
Y (T )
X(T )
)〉
− E
〈
PL(0)
(
Y (0)
X(0)
)
,
(
Y (0)
X(0)
)〉
=E
∫ T
0
〈(
Y
X
)
, PLA
(
Y
X
)
+ Γ
(
Y
X
)
+ ΛC
(
Y
X
)
+ C⊤Λ
(
Y
X
)
+ A⊤PL
(
Y
X
)
+ C⊤PLC
(
Y
X
)〉
ds
+ E
∫ T
0
〈(
u1
Z
)
, 2B⊤PL
(
Y
X
)
+ 2D⊤Λ
(
Y
X
)
+ 2D⊤PLC
(
Y
X
)〉
ds
+ E
∫ T
0
〈(
u1
D
)
,D⊤PLD
(
u1
D
)〉
ds.
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Adding this into the functional, we have
J(ξ, u1(·))
=
1
2
E
{
〈G1ξ, ξ〉+ 〈H1X(0), X(0)〉+
∫ T
0
[
〈Q1X,X〉+ 〈S1Z,Z〉+
〈
R111u1, u1)
〉]
ds
−
〈
PL(T )
(
Y (T )
X(T )
)
,
(
Y (T )
X(T )
)〉
+
〈
PL(0)
(
Y (0)
X(0)
)
,
(
Y (0)
X(0)
)〉
+
∫ T
0
〈(
Y
X
)
, PLA
(
Y
X
)
+ Γ
(
Y
X
)
+ ΛC
(
Y
X
)
+ C⊤Λ
(
Y
X
)
+ A⊤PL
(
Y
X
)
+ C⊤PLC
(
Y
X
)〉
ds
+
∫ T
0
〈(
u1
Z
)
, 2B⊤PL
(
Y
X
)
+ 2D⊤Λ
(
Y
X
)
+ 2D⊤PLC
(
Y
X
)〉
ds
+
∫ T
0
〈(
u1
Z
)
,D⊤PLD
(
u1
Z
)〉
ds
}
=
1
2
E
{〈[(
0 0
0 H1
)
+ PL(0)
](
Y (0)
X(0)
)
,
(
Y (0)
X(0)
)〉
+
1
2
〈G1ξ, ξ〉
+
∫ T
0
〈(
Y
X
)
,Q
(
Y
X
)
+ PLA
(
Y
X
)
+ Γ
(
Y
X
)
+ ΛC
(
Y
X
)
+ C⊤Λ
(
Y
X
)
+ A⊤PL
(
Y
X
)
+ C⊤PLC
(
Y
X
)〉
ds
+
∫ T
0
〈(
u1
Z
)
, 2B⊤PL
(
Y
X
)
+ 2D⊤Λ
(
Y
X
)
+ 2D⊤PLC
(
Y
X
)〉
ds
+
∫ T
0
〈(
u1
Z
)
, (R+ D⊤PLD)
(
u1
Z
)〉
ds
}
.
Note that
E
∫ T
0
〈(
u1
Z
)
, 2B⊤PL
(
Y
X
)
+ 2D⊤Λ
(
Y
X
)
+ 2D⊤PLC
(
Y
X
)〉
ds+ E
∫ T
0
〈(
u1
Z
)
, (R+ D⊤PLD)
(
u1
Z
)〉
ds
=E
∫ T
0
〈
(R+ D⊤PLD)
((
u1
Z
)
+ (R+ D⊤PLD)
−1(B⊤PL + D
⊤Λ + D⊤PLC)
(
Y
X
))
,(
u1
Z
)
+ (R+ D⊤PLD)
−1(B⊤PL + D
⊤Λ + D⊤PLC)
(
Y
X
)〉
ds
− E
∫ T
0
〈
(B⊤PL + D
⊤Λ + D⊤PLC)
(
Y
X
)
, (R+ D⊤PLD)
−1(B⊤PL + D
⊤Λ + D⊤PLC)
(
Y
X
)〉
ds.
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and recall the definition of Γ, we have
J(ξ, u1(·))
=
1
2
E
{〈[(
0 0
0 H1
)
+ PL(0)
](
Y (0)
X(0)
)
,
(
Y (0)
X(0)
)〉
+
∫ T
0
〈(
Y
X
)
,Q
(
Y
X
)
+ PLA
(
Y
X
)
+ Γ
(
Y
X
)
+ ΛC
(
Y
X
)
+ C⊤Λ
(
Y
X
)
+ A⊤PL
(
Y
X
)
+ C⊤PLC
(
Y
X
)〉
ds
−
∫ T
0
〈(
Y
X
)
, (B⊤PL + D
⊤Λ + D⊤PLC)
⊤(R+ D⊤PLD)
−1(B⊤PL + D
⊤Λ + D⊤PLC)
(
Y
X
)〉
ds
+
∫ T
0
〈
(R+ D⊤PLD)
[(
u1
Z
)
+ (R+ D⊤PLD)
−1(B⊤PL + D
⊤Λ + D⊤PLC)
(
Y
X
)]
,(
u1
Z
)
+ (R+ D⊤PLD)
−1(B⊤PL + D
⊤Λ + D⊤PLC)
(
Y
X
)〉
ds
}
=
1
2
E
〈[(
0 0
0 H1
)
+ PL(0)
](
Y (0)
X(0)
)
,
(
Y (0)
X(0)
)〉
+
1
2
E
∫ T
0
〈
(R+ D⊤PLD)
[(
u1
Z
)
+ (R+ D⊤PLD)
−1(B⊤PL + D
⊤Λ + D⊤PLC)
(
Y
X
)]
,(
u1
Z
)
+ (R+ D⊤PLD)
−1(B⊤PL + D
⊤Λ + D⊤PLC)
(
Y
X
)〉
ds. 
7.3 Proof of Theorem 5.1:
First, we will give two lemmas. Note that for a given (X(·), Z(·))×X(0) ∈ L2
F
(0, T ;Rm)×L2
F
(0, T ;Rm)×
L2F0(Ω;R
m), where X(0) is the value of process X(·) at initial time, the forward equation in the BFS-
DEs (29) has a unique solution Y (·) ∈ L2
F
(0, T ;Rn), thus we introduce a map M1 : L
2
F
(0, T ;Rm) ×
L2
F
(0, T ;Rm)× L2F0(Ω;R
m)→ L2
F
(0, T ;Rn), through
Y (t) = h(X(0)) +
∫ t
0
b(s, Y,X, Z)ds+
∫ t
0
σ(s, Y,X, Z)dW (s). (72)
Therefore, E supt∈[0,T ] |Y (t)|
2 <∞. For any ρ ∈ R, define ‖X‖ρ ,
(
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt|X(t)|2dt
) 1
2
.
Lemma 7.2 Let Yi(·) be the solution of (72) corresponding to (Xi(·), Zi(·)) ∈ L2F(0, T ;R
m)×L2
F
(0, T ;Rm), i =
1, 2. Then for all ρ ∈ R, c1, c2 > 0, we have
e−ρtE|Ŷ (t)|2 + ρ¯1
∫ t
0
e−ρsE|Ŷ (s)|2ds
≤k28E|X̂(0)|
2 + (k1c1 + k
2
6)
∫ t
0
e−ρsE|X̂(s)|2ds+ (k2c2 + k
2
7)
∫ t
0
e−ρsE|Ẑ(s)|2ds,
(73)
e−ρtE|Ŷ (t)|2 ≤k28e
−ρ¯1tE|X̂(0)|2 + (k1c1 + k
2
6)
∫ t
0
e−ρ¯1(t−s)−ρsE|X̂(s)|2ds
+ (k2c2 + k
2
7)
∫ t
0
e−ρ¯1(t−s)−ρsE|Ẑ(s)|2ds,
(74)
where ρ¯1 = ρ− 2ρ1 − k1c
−1
1 − k2c
−1
2 − k
2
5 and ϕ̂ = ϕ1 − ϕ2, ϕ = Y,X,Z. Moreover, we have
||Ŷ (·)||2ρ ≤
1− e−ρ¯1T
ρ¯1
[
k28E|X̂(0)|
2 + (k1c1 + k
2
6)||X̂(·)||
2
ρ + (k2c2 + k
2
7)||Ẑ(·)||
2
ρ
]
, (75)
e−ρTE|Ŷ (T )|2 ≤ max{1, e−ρ¯1T }
[
k28E|X̂(0)|
2 + (k1c1 + k
2
6)||X̂(·)||
2
ρ + (k2c2 + k
2
7)||Ẑ(·)||
2
ρ
]
. (76)
In particular, if ρ¯1 > 0, we have
e−ρTE|Ŷ (T )|2 ≤ k28E|X̂(0)|
2 + (k1c1 + k
2
6)||X̂(s)||
2
ρ + (k2c2 + k
2
7)||Ẑ(·)||
2
ρ.
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Proof Under (H5), applying Itoˆ’s formula to e−ρs|Ŷ (s)|2 and taking expectation, we obtain (73). Fur-
thermore, applying Itoˆ’s formula again to e−ρ¯1(t−s)−ρs|Ŷ (s)|2 for s ∈ [0, t] and taking expectation, we get
(74). Integrating both sides of (74) on [0, T ] and noting 1−e
−ρ¯1(T−s)
ρ¯1
≤ 1−e
−ρ¯1T
ρ¯1
, ∀s ∈ [0, T ], we have (75).
Letting t = T in (74) and noticing that e−ρ¯1(T−s) ≤ max{1, e−ρ¯1T }, we obtain (76). 
Similarly, for given Y (·) ∈ L2
F
(0, T ;Rn), the backward equation in the BFSDEs (29) has a unique solu-
tion (X(·), Z(·)) ∈ L2
F
(0, T ;Rm) × L2
F
(0, T ;Rm), and the corresponding initial value of X(·) is denoted
by X(0) ∈ L2F0(Ω;R
m). Thus, we can introduce another map M2 : L
2
F
(0, T ;Rn) → L2
F
(0, T ;Rm) ×
L2
F
(0, T ;Rm)× L2F0(Ω;R
m), through
X(t) = g(Y (T ),EY (T )) +
∫ T
0
f(s, Y,X, Z)ds−
∫ T
0
ZdW (s), (77)
which satisfies E sup
t∈[0,T ]
|X(t)|2 + E
∫ T
0 |Z(t)|
2dt <∞. Similar to Lemma 7.2, we have
Lemma 7.3 Let (Xi(·), Zi(·)) be the solution of (77) corresponding to Yi(·) ∈ L2F(0, T ;R
n), i = 1, 2.
Then for all ρ ∈ R, c3, c4 > 0, we have
e−ρtE|X̂(t)|2 + ρ¯2
∫ T
0
e−ρsE|X̂(s)|2ds+ (1− k4c4)
∫ T
0
e−ρsE|Ẑ(s)|2ds
≤(k29 + k
2
10)E|Ŷ (T )|
2 + k3c3
∫ T
0
e−ρsE|Ŷ (s)|2ds,
e−ρtE|X̂(t)|2 + (1− k4c4)
∫ T
0
e−ρ¯2(s−t)−ρsE|Ẑ(s)|2ds
≤(k29 + k
2
10)e
−ρ¯2(T−t)−ρTE|Ŷ (T )|2 + k3c3
∫ T
0
e−ρ¯2(s−t)−ρsE|Ŷ (s)|2ds,
where ρ¯2 = −ρ− 2ρ2 − k3c
−1
3 − k4c
−1
4 and ϕ̂ = ϕ1 − ϕ2, ϕ = Y,X,Z. Moreover, choosing c4 ∈ (0, k
−1
4 ),
we have
||X̂(·)||2ρ ≤
1− e−ρ¯2T
ρ¯2
[
(k29 + k
2
10)e
−ρTE|Ŷ (T )|2 + k3c3||Ŷ (·)||
2
ρ
]
,
||Ẑ(·)||2ρ ≤
(k29 + k
2
10)e
−(ρ¯2+ρ)TE|Ŷ (T )|2 + k3c3max{1, e−ρ¯2T }||Ŷ (·)||2ρ
(1− k4c4)min{1, e−ρ¯2T }
,
E|X̂(0)|2 ≤ max{1, e−ρ¯2T }
[
(k29 + k
2
10)e
−ρTE|Ŷ (T )|2 + k3c3||Ŷ (·)||
2
ρ
]
.
In particular, if ρ¯2 > 0, we have
||Ẑ(·)||2ρ ≤
(k29 + k
2
10)E|Ŷ (T )|
2 + k3c3||Ŷ (·)||
2
ρ
1− k4c4
.
Now we will give the proof of Theorem 5.1. Consider the map M ,M2 ◦M1. It suffices to show that M
is a contraction mapping under || · ||ρ. In fact, for (Xi(·), Zi(·))×Xi(0) ∈ L2F(0, T ;R
m)×L2
F
(0, T ;Rm)×
L2F0(Ω;R
m), i = 1, 2, let Yi , M1(Xi(·), Zi(·), Xi(0)) and (X¯i(·), Z¯i(·), X¯i(0)) , M((Xi(·), Zi(·), Xi(0))),
by Lemmas 7.2 and 7.3, we have
E|X¯1(0)− X¯2(0)|
2 + ||X¯1(·)− X¯2(·)||
2
ρ + ||Z¯1(·)− Z¯2(·)||
2
ρ
≤
[
1− e−ρ¯2T
ρ¯2
+
max{1, e−ρ¯2T }
(1 − k4c4)min{1, e−ρ¯2T }
+max{1, e−ρ¯2T }
] [
(k29 + k
2
10)e
−ρTE|Ŷ (T )|2 + k3c3||Ŷ (·)||
2
ρ
]
≤
[
1− e−ρ¯2T
ρ¯2
+
max{1, e−ρ¯2T }
(1 − k4c4)min{1, e−ρ¯2T }
+max{1, e−ρ¯2T }
] [
(k29 + k
2
10)max{1, e
−ρ¯1T }+ k3c3
1− e−ρ¯1T
ρ¯1
]
×
[
k28E|X̂(0)|
2 + (k1c1 + k
2
6)||X̂(·)||
2
ρ + (k2c2 + k
2
7)||Ẑ(·)||
2
ρ
]
.
Recalling that ρ¯1 = ρ− 2ρ1− k1c
−1
1 − k2c
−1
2 − k
2
5 and ρ¯2 = −ρ− 2ρ2 − k3c
−1
3 − k4c
−1
4 . Then by choosing
suitable ρ, the first assertion is immediate. For the second assertion, since 2(ρ1+ ρ2) < −k24 − k
2
5, we can
35
choose a ρ ∈ R, 0 < c4 < k
−1
4 and sufficient large c1, c2, c3 such that ρ¯1 > 0, ρ¯2 > 0, 1 − k4c4 > 0.
Then, using a similar method, we get
E|X¯1(0)− X¯2(0)|
2 + ||X¯1(·)− X¯2(·)||
2
ρ + ||Z¯1(·)− Z¯2(·)||
2
ρ
≤
[
1
ρ¯2
+
1
1− k4c4
+ 1
] [
k29 + k
2
10 +
k3c3
ρ¯1
] [
k28E|X̂(0)|
2 + (k1c1 + k
2
6)||X̂(·)||
2
ρ + (k2c2 + k
2
7)||Ẑ(·)||
2
ρ
]
. 
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